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Introduction
In many parts of the world, people rely on micro and small enterprises (MSEs) as
sources of income. In fact, in some African countries, 20–40% of households operate
micro businesses (Mead and Liedholm, 1998; Liedholm, 2002). Furthermore, the
majority of these businesses are operated by a single person. Importantly, unlike
their counterparts in developed countries who value entrepreneurship principally
as an opportunity, a significant proportion of the so-called “entrepreneurs” in
developing countries are forced into this kind of activity (Acs, 2006) after being
excluded from the labor market because of the limited employment opportunities
and/or a lack of appropriate skills to fill the positions available.
Because of the informality and the micro features of the activity, establishing
a micro business is relatively easy in developing countries, with relatively small
demand for the necessary startup capital. As a result, most of these businesses are
established using personal savings or borrowings from informal sources, such as
family and friends (Verheul and Thurik, 2001). In Indonesia, for example, almost
four out of every five new micro businesses rely on informal sources of capital. In
turn, these informal sources of capital help determine the size of the businesses
able to commence. These effects are particularly pronounced in Africa, where the
annual growth in the number of newly established MSEs is about 20–30%, a much
higher rate than that typically found in developed countries (Mead and Liedholm,
1998).
However, despite the apparent ease in establishing MSEs, ensuring the survival
and growth of such enterprises is challenging. A high percentage of MSEs close
down before operating for at least three years, and less than 3% grow to employ
more than three employees (Liedholm, 2002). These features are probably the result
of the fact that necessity drives entrepreneurship, which means that entrepreneurs
potentially lack the entrepreneurial skills and mindsets to expand their business,
with most MSEs managed by people with a limited formal educational background.
The lack of financial capital is frequently cited as the most important barrier to
the development of MSEs (see, for example, Batra et al., 2003). Obtaining credit
from banks is almost impossible for the poor. From the banks’ perspective, there
are many reasons not to extend loans to poor entrepreneurs, including the lack of
collateral, the demanding documentation required and the higher cost of lending
owing to the relatively small size of the loans.
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In this regard, the establishment of microcredit in Bangladesh in the early 1970s
has been seen as an important innovation in this area, because it requires the poor
to have only social collateral to obtain a loan. Potential borrowers may then form
a joint liability group in which they guarantee each other’s loans. The presence of
this group shifts the burden of screening and monitoring from the lender to the
borrowers. Since then, millions of people around the world have accessed small
loans using this type of scheme.
For years, microfinance has been recognized as a powerful tool for poverty
reduction. Perversely, there are no rigorous evaluations concerning the causal
relationship between microfinance and poverty reduction (Bateman, 2010). Recent
randomized control trials used to evaluate the impact of microfinance provide some
evidence that microfinance is not the miracle for poverty reduction, as claimed by
some of its supporters. However, in the short run, microfinance has a significant
impact on business establishment and business expenditure on durable goods
(Banerjee et al., 2010). Whether this leads to poverty reduction in the long run
remains unknown.
Furthermore, even though group lending practices have been praised for opening
up access to finance by the poor, they are also criticized for several potential
problems that may emerge (for a review, see Harper, 2007). Theoretically, group
lending should work. A group of people with a common interest should collaborate
as best as they can to secure access to finance. They should then follow the rules
in borrowing and be disciplined in making repayments. However, in practice, free
riding and moral hazard are not uncommon. Understanding the factors that affect
group performance is then critical and useful for both borrowers and lenders to
ensure that both parties benefit from the lender–borrower relationship.
For at least some entrepreneurs, relaxation of the financial capital constraint
may also need to be accompanied by increasing human capital, particularly the
managerial skills needed for running the business and generating profits. Training
and mentoring processes may be able to play an important role, although whether
entrepreneurship can be actually taught remains debatable (Klein and Bullock,
2006).
In a recent review on the impact of training for entrepreneurs, McKenzie and
Woodruff (2012) suggest that although several types of training do have an impact
on different outcomes, such as business practices and the establishment and survival
of businesses, many training programs generate no significant results. Hence, many
components need to be improved so that policy makers have greater confidence in
scaling up these interventions.
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Relaxing financial and human capital constraints may together improve the
internal capacity of entrepreneurs to be able to expand their businesses. However,
there are also external factors that determine the success, such as the availability of
infrastructure, that play an important role in the progress of MSEs. Hence, along
with the effort required to strengthen the capacity of entrepreneurs, there is a need
to develop the necessary infrastructure, such as transportation, that could reduce
the transaction costs for entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, even if all these necessary
conditions are in place, the success of entrepreneurship cannot be taken for granted.
Furthermore, the entrepreneurial character is indeed a critical input for business
success. Entrepreneurs’ traits and characteristics may affect their willingness and
ability to expand their businesses. Necessary personality traits for entrepreneurship
include vision and passion, integrity, and the ability to work in teams (Ernst &
Young, 2011). Hence, it is critical to learn how these personality traits are acquired
and develop.
This dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing effort to strengthen MSEs
by providing evidence of the mechanisms that may or may not work in relation
to increasing human and financial capital in these enterprises. In the first paper,
we compare the outcomes of training for different types of instructors, namely
professionals and credit officers, with the objective of ascertaining their effects on
training outcomes. In the second paper, we consider the effect of different gender
compositions in microfinance groups, with the objective of better understanding
the impact of gender on group performance. In the third paper, we analyze whether
a mobile phone text reminder can stimulate the timely repayment of loans. Ideally,
borrowers would not forget the due date of their loans, but they may do so because
of limited attention. The final paper employs quite a different setup in being a
more descriptive analysis of the secondary data sources used in considering the
formation of preferences important for the success of entrepreneurs.
The summary of each paper is as follows.
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Business Training in Tanzania:
From Research-driven Experiment to Local Implementation
The first paper in this dissertation aims to shed light on the effect of replenishing the
human capital of entrepreneurs. The paper is co-authored with Lars Ivar Oppedal
Berge, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden and published in the Journal of
African Economies.
Field experiments to evaluate the impact of a particular intervention are
designed and closely monitored by the researchers. After the evaluation period, the
researchers remove themselves from the program, and the program may or may not
be scaled up. The fact that the program was closely monitored by the researchers
may influence the implementation of the program and eventually the impact of
the program. The question, then, is whether the impact of intervention can be
sustained after the researchers exit and the program is locally implemented.
We address the issue of scaling up of research-led interventions and compare the
outcomes of a business training program for microfinance borrowers with different
instructors, either professionals or credit officers, and whether this affects training
outcomes.
The participants were randomly assigned into classes across the two types of
instructors. The materials, the sequence of training, and the class environment are
the same in the two groups; the only thing that differs is the type of instructor.
If the program is scaled up, it is most likely that the credit officers will deliver
training because hiring external instructors is relatively costly.
The results show that the class with the professional instructor was clearly
more successful than that with the credit officer. First, attendance was higher and
the externally trained entrepreneurs considered the course to be more beneficial.
Second, the externally trained entrepreneurs gained more business knowledge and
reported a higher level of happiness with their overall situation. Business knowledge,
course satisfaction and general happiness were measured two and a half years after
the training was completed, which suggests lasting differences in assessment and
impact. The results thus indicate that the impact of external research projects
may represent an upper bound of what would be the impact if such projects were
to be scaled up by a local organization.
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Group Composition and Group Dynamics:
Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment with Microfinance
Clients
The second paper in this dissertation represents joint work with Lars Ivar Oppedal
Berge and Linda Helgesson Sekei. This paper looks at how gender composition
affects group performance in a microfinance setting in which the ability of each
member of the group to cooperate with other group members is critical to group
performance.
In this study, microfinance borrowers were randomly chosen to be part of a
laboratory experiment and then randomly assigned into different groups by gender
composition: single-gender groups (male or female) and mixed-gender groups. The
participants were requested to solve problems and take decisions regarding risk in
the group.
The results show that the gender composition is important for the functioning of
groups in several respects. The main findings are as follows. First, the willingness
of neither men nor women to contribute in the public good game was influenced
by the gender composition of their group. Second, in the problem-solving, group
composition matters, as female-only groups outperformed both male-only and
mixed-gender groups, even though women individually performed much more
poorly than men. These results suggest that gender composition matters in the
ability to cooperate, but not in the willingness to cooperate in groups. Finally,
we observed a shift to more cautious decisions in groups regardless of gender
composition. However, the proportion of female-only groups that take risks was
significantly higher compared with mixed groups.
A Nudge to Remember:
Evidence from a Field Experiment with Pawnshop
Borrowers
Some entrepreneurs and employees may be able to accumulate in-kind savings
such as jewelry or electronics. These people can then use these kinds of goods
as collateral so they can access finance from sources other than microfinance
institutions, such as pawnshops. Pawnshops can provide loans just as small as in
microfinance. Furthermore, a pawnshop can provide loans with lower transaction
costs because there is no joint liability or weekly meetings with the pawnshop and
loan procurement is comparatively quick.
In some cases, such as in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the pawnshop actually
benefits the poor, even though it generally involves a negative stigma (Bouman
and Houtman, 1988; Fernando, 2003).
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In the pawnshop, a borrower pledges his or her collateral to obtain a loan, and
the borrower has to redeem the goods before the maturity date or the pawned
items may be auctioned. However, due to limited attention, some people may
forget the item and the loan. This study aims to measure the impact of a nudge in
the form of a Short Message Service (SMS) reminder to help borrowers remember
their pawned items so that they do not lose their valuables in the auction.
In a field experiment in Indonesia, we randomly assigned one-third of the
borrowers who could potentially miss their repayments into a control group, with
the remaining two-thirds receiving an SMS reminder. The results show that a text
reminder increases the proportion of borrowers who go to the pawnshop before the
due date by 6.9 percentage points. Different content of the text did not appear to
generate any difference in the main result. Furthermore, we find that women drive
the overall treatment effect.
Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences:
Evidence from the Indonesian Family Life Survey
The fourth paper aims to identify the factors that determine an individual’s
preferences, with a particular emphasis on observing the effect of the
intergenerational transmission of preferences. There are three preferences of
interest: trust, risk and time preferences. These preferences are important for the
development of enterprises because they affect both selection into entrepreneurship
and the decisions made in these enterprises, which ultimately affect business
outcomes.
The study employs data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which is
the first and most comprehensive longitudinal dataset available in the country. The
fact that the survey measured the preferences of all adult members of the households
surveyed provides an advantage in that the measurement of the preferences of
parents and children is identical. Each child is paired with both father and mother
using the first wave of the IFLS data (IFLS1), and the pairs are merged with the
respective characteristics and preferences of the child, the father and the mother
from the data in the fourth wave (IFLS4).
The results show that there is a positive correlation between the trust, risk
and time preferences of children and their parents. In general, the mother has a
larger role in shaping the child’s trusting behavior than the father, whereas the
father has a more important role in shaping the child’s willingness to take risk
and willingness to wait. In general, we discern similar results and patterns to
the findings from a similar study using German data. On this basis, we conclude
that the intergenerational transmission of preferences is robust across countries,
regardless of any differences in institutional and policy settings.
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Erratum
Page 18, second paragraph of subsection 4.1: “On average, the clients in the
externally trained group attended 13.0 sessions and the clients in the internally
trained group attended thirteen sessions.”
Correction: “On average, the clients in the externally trained group attended
15.7 sessions and the clients in the internally trained group attended thirteen
sessions.”
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Chapter 1
Business Training in Tanzania:
From Research-driven Experiment to
Local Implementation

Business Training in Tanzania: From
Research-driven Experiment to Local
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Abstract
Field experiments documenting positive treatment effects have a strong
policy message: scale up! However, such experiments are typically imple-
mented under close supervision of the research group in charge of the
study. In contrast, scaling up would typically imply relying on local organisa-
tion. It is not obvious that the positive treatment effects identified in the
research-driven intervention can be replicated locally. The present study
explicitly addresses this challenge by analysing the local version of a
research-driven business training programme among microfinance entre-
preneurs in Tanzania. Comparing the local programme with the research-
†This paper is part of a joint project between the research groups in development econom-
ics and experimental economics at the Department of Economics, Norwegian School of
Economics and the research centre Equality, Social Organization, and Performance
(ESOP) at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo. We have also received financial
support from Sparebanken Vest and the Research Council of Norway. We warmly acknow-
ledge the support of Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises (PRIDE
Tanzania), Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA, Tanzania) and the University of Dar es
Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC, Tanzania) in the design and implementation of
the business training programme. A special thanks for excellent research assistance to
Maria T. Frengstad, Tumainiel Ngowi, Linda Helgesson Sekei, Sheena Keller and Juda
Lyamai.
# The author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for the
Study of African Economies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email:
journals.permissions@oup.com
Journal of African Economies, Vol. 21, number 5, pp. 808–827
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led programme in terms of attendance and subjective evaluation, we find
that success in local implementation cannot be taken for granted.
Moreover, an analysis of long-term outcomes also demonstrates a weaker
impact of the local programme. We conclude that the estimated effect of
research-led interventions should be interpreted as an upper bound of
what can be achieved when scaling up such interventions locally.
JEL classification: C81, D04, I25, C93
1. Introduction
Field experiments are widely used in developing countries to investigate a
host of issues of importance to policy-makers, such as the role of
community participation in improving health services (Bjo¨rkman and
Svensson, 2009), the effect of deworming on educational outcomes
(Kremer and Miguel, 2003) and the effect of business training on microen-
terprise development (Berge et al., 2011; Karlan and Valdivia, 2011). These
studies evaluate carefully implemented interventions, closely monitored by
a research team. To draw policy implications, however, one would like to
know what the effect of a programme is when the researchers have
stepped back. Are local stakeholders able to implement similar
programmes?
The difficulty of scaling up is particularly pressing when the programme
is complex, where the intervention stretches over time, and where the
organisational setting and skills of the service providers matter greatly
for the quality of the services provided. As emphasised by Sternberg
et al. (2006) when analysing the challenges of scaling up educational pro-
grammes: ‘Programs often work on a small scale due to adoption by highly
motivated individuals. Moreover, in the context of small-scale implemen-
tations, a key factor is often the proximity of the creators of the program to
its first adopters and implementers. This proximity implies not only the
physical proximity, but also the proximity of ideas and beliefs - those
educators who are willing to try new programs usually see a value in
doing so and thus are more predisposed to raise the odds of the
program to succeed. Therefore, programs may work on a small scale, but
they fail when they are upscaled because the initial sample of the program’s
deliverers was not representative of the larger population’ (pp. 206–7).
In Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010) and Berge et al. (2011), we docu-
ment by a randomised field experiment that a business training
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 by guest on February 22, 2013
http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
12
programme given by professional trainers from the University of Dar es
Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC) significantly affected business
skills, entrepreneurial attitudes, business practices and business outcomes
among microfinance clients of the microfinance institution Promotion
of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprise (PRIDE) Tanzania. For
PRIDE, the business training programme was seen as a pilot project that,
if successful, would be scaled up in one form or another by the institution.
However, two important questions remain: Can they implement the pro-
gramme? Should they implement it?
The main focus of the present paper is on the first question. We analyse a
local version of the intervention where some microfinance clients were
offered training by internal credit officers, and compare it with the inter-
vention using professional trainers from UDEC. This comparison sheds
light on PRIDE’s ability to implement such a programme. Outsourcing
business training to professional trainers, such as UDEC, is expensive
and hard to implement on a large scale in Tanzania, and thus an important
question for PRIDE when considering whether to scale up is whether such
a programme can be offered in-house. Would the quality of an internal
programme be sufficiently high to attract the attention of the
entrepreneurs?
The second question is whether PRIDE should implement the pro-
gramme. In Berge et al. (2011), we document a positive impact of business
training on business outcomes, in particular for male entrepreneurs. Thus,
from a societal point of view, business training is likely to be beneficial.
However, as stressed by Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2010), a
microfinance institution typically balances social impacts, on the one
hand, and financial sustainability, on the other hand, and the impact of
business training on the latter is not trivial.
One motive for PRIDE to offer business training to its clients on a
regular basis is clearly that this could provide a competitive edge over
other microfinance institutions and, thus, attract more customers.
Another argument in favour of business training is that the clients’
increased skills and potentially stronger loyalty to the institution could
translate into higher loans and fewer repayment problems. But this is
not necessarily the outcome. Indeed, a more knowledgeable and successful
entrepreneur may find cheaper sources of finance outside the microfinance
institution. If training triggers the exit of clients, the microfinance institu-
tion may become more reluctant to offer such services to its clients.
Further, PRIDE’s decision on whether to offer the training would also
depend on the clients’ willingness to pay for the service. Does PRIDE
810 | Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge et al.
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have to offer the programme for free in order to make it attractive to the
clients, or can the costs be covered by imposing a participation fee? We
discuss these issues in the concluding part of the paper.
Our main finding is that the external training clearly worked better than
the internal training. First, attendance was higher and the course was consid-
ered more beneficial by the externally trained entrepreneurs; second, the ex-
ternally trained entrepreneurs gainedmore business knowledge and reported
a higher level of happiness with their overall situation. Business knowledge,
course satisfaction and general happiness were measured two and a half years
after the training was completed, which suggests enduring differences in as-
sessment and impact. Our results thus indicate that the impact of external
research projects may represent an upper bound of what would be the
impact if such projects were to be scaled up by a local organisation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly
describes the intervention, a business training programme offered to
microfinance clients in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Section 3 presents the
data and the empirical strategy, with an emphasis on randomisation pro-
cedures and the treatment–control balance, and Section 4 reports the
main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. The training programme
The business training programme consisted of twenty-one sessions, each
lasting 45 min, and was offered for free at the premises of the
microfinance institution immediately after the weekly loan meeting of
the clients. The aim of the programme, which commenced in August
2008 and ended in January 2009, was to unleash entrepreneurship
among the microfinance clients. It was developed by UDEC and piloted ex-
tensively.1 The course covered a range of topics, such as record-keeping,
marketing practices, customer care and employee management. A partici-
patory method was adopted, with the sessions focusing on real-world
examples in order to make the insights vivid for the clients. The trainers
also encouraged the participants to learn from each other’s experiences
and to share their business challenges and problems.
For capacity-building purposes, PRIDE chose four of its most experi-
enced credit officers to be involved in the training of a subset of the
clients. The credit officers attended the sessions given by the professional
trainers, and were also instructed and evaluated by them.
1 The training programme is described in detail in Berge et al. (2011).
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3. Empirical strategy
We use a randomised field experiment to study PRIDE’s ability to imple-
ment the business training programme using internal resources.2 One
group of clients was randomly assigned to be trained by professional trai-
ners (external intervention), whereas another group of clients was assigned
to receive the same training from the internal credit officers (internal inter-
vention). In all other respects, the training programmes were identical.
They covered the same content and were given at the same premises follow-
ing the loan meeting of the clients. The two groups were also treated in the
same manner by PRIDE. A snack and a soft drink were offered to all par-
ticipants in each session, and everyone was given the incentive of receiving
a graduation diploma if attending at least ten sessions. Thus, the only dif-
ference between the two interventions was the trainers. Given that the
clients were randomly allocated to an internal or an external trainer, we
can therefore identify the causal effect of replacing an external trainer by
an internal trainer.
3.1 Randomisation procedures
We selected two of PRIDE’s branches in Dar es Salaam, located in
Magomeni and Buguruni, for the interventions. The training was offered
on Tuesdays in Magomeni and on Thursdays in Buguruni. The external
training was offered to clients who had their loan meetings between
9 a.m. and 1 p.m., the internal training was offered to clients who had
their loan meeting at 2 p.m. We included only clients with PRIDE loans
between 500,000 TZS (USD 335) and 1,000,000 TZS (USD 670),
amounts that represent the second and third steps on the loan ladder in
the group lending programme. This was motivated by the fact that there
are very high dropout rates among clients with smaller loans, and also
that we wanted to avoid an excessively heterogeneous target group for
the sessions. At the chosen time slots, there were 565 clients eligible for
external training and 114 clients eligible for internal training.
As loan groups are randomly assigned a loan meeting day and hour
according to the availability of time slots at the branches of PRIDE,
there is no reason to believe that there is any systematic difference
between the eligible clients according to the time of the loan meeting.
This is also confirmed by our baseline data. There is, for example, no
2 On the methodology of randomisation, see Duflo et al. (2008). For a critical perspective,
see Deaton (2010) and Rodrik (2009).
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correlation between the sectors in which the entrepreneurs are involved
and the time of their loan meeting. Thus, our working hypothesis is that
the entrepreneurs were effectively randomly assigned to either external
or internal training.
The share of eligible clients that showed up at the first or second session
was almost identical for the two groups, 290 out of 565 for the externally
trained group (51.4%) and 59 out of 114 (51.8%) for the internally trained
group. These clients constitute the sample of our analysis.3 There is no
reason to assume that the selection process into the initial sessions
differs between the externally trained group and the internally trained
group.4 First, we used the same invitation letter for external and internal
training, and there was no mentioning of who would be the instructor.
Second, the external trainer played a leading role in the initial sessions
also in the internal programme.
In sum, we argue that there should be no systematic difference between
the pool of clients that initially showed up for the external training or the
internal training. Hence, we shall think of the comparison between the
clients receiving external training and those receiving internal training as
a randomised field experiment measuring the treatment effect on the
treated.
3.2 Treatment–control balances
Table 1 shows the balance on observables between the externally trained
group and the internally trained group. There are no significant differences
3 Focusing only on those who attended the first session gives very similar results to those
reported here, but the sample size is naturally smaller. Note that our analysis is restricted
to clients who received training. An alternative approach would be to include all eligible
clients in the sample and conduct an intention to treat analysis. For the internal group,
however, we have detailed data only on the clients actually attending the training, and
thus we are restricted to a comparison of the treatment effect on the treated.
4 There was a slight difference in the recruitment procedure between the external and the
internal group. For the external group, we conducted a baseline survey where we managed
to interview 319 of the 565 eligible clients. The baseline survey was presented to the entre-
preneurs as an effort ‘to identify strategies to improve the functioning of microcredit
institutions in Tanzania’, and, hence, they were not informed about the prospective busi-
ness training course. After the baseline survey, the clients we had reached received an in-
vitation to attend training. We did not conduct a baseline survey of the clients assigned to
internal training because we did not initially plan to include them in the research part of
the project. For this group, therefore, we invited all eligible clients whomwe could reach at
the loan meeting where the training was announced.
Business Training in Tanzania | 813
 by guest on February 22, 2013
http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
16
between the two groups on observable background variables, which
indicates that the randomisation procedure was successful.
In 2011, we conducted a follow-up study of all the clients who received
training. For both the internally and externally trained group, we collected
information on their subjective rating of how beneficial they had found the
course, conducted a business knowledge test and also collected data on
how happy they were with their overall situation. For the externally
trained group, we also collected more detailed information on their
business performance, but for practical reasons it was not feasible for us
to collect such data for the internally trained group.
In the follow-up study, we managed to reach 268 out of 290 in the
externally trained group and forty-seven out of fifty-nine in the internally
trained group. As we show in the appendix, the follow-up sample is also
balanced on observable variables across the treatment groups (Table A1),
and the thirty-four clients that we did not reach in the follow-up survey
differ from the interviewed sample only on one observable background
variable, loan size (Table A2). The assignment to internal training is pre-
dictive of attrition (Table A3), however, and, therefore, we report in the ap-
pendix robustness checks of our main analysis (Table A4), adopting the
approaches of Kling et al. (2007) and Lee (2009).5 Largely, our main
Table 1: Treatment–Control Balance (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Internal group External group Difference
Female 0.61 (0.03) 0.63 (0.06) 0.61 (0.03) 0.02 (0.07)
Age 39.20 (0.45) 37.59 (0.90) 39.53 (0.51) 21.94 (1.19)
Loan size 753.01 (12.74) 754.24 (31.27) 752.76 (13.97) 1.48 (34.04)
Education 7.82 (0.12) 7.83 (0.29) 7.82 (0.13) 0.01 (0.31)
Branch 0.49 (0.03) 0.44 (0.07) 0.50 (0.03) 20.06 (0.07)
Observations 349 59 290
Notes: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variablewith a value of 1 if the
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size
in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of
schooling. Branch is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the branch is Magomeni
and 0 if it is Buguruni. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
5 These approaches are also adopted in other recent work on entrepreneurship training, see,
for example, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) and Fairlie et al. (2012).
814 | Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge et al.
 by guest on February 22, 2013
http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
17
results are not sensitive to various assumptions about the treatment effect
for attriters.
3.3 Econometric model
The main strategy in the empirical analysis is to estimate the following
equation:
Yi = b0 + b1Internali + gXi + 1i, (1)
where Y is an outcome variable, Internal is a binary variable taking the
value of 1 if the entrepreneur was offered training by the internal instructor
and 0 if offered training by the external instructor, and X is a vector of
control variables. Given that there are no systematic differences between
the internally trained and the externally trained group, b1 is an estimate
of the causal impact of receiving training from an internal trainer rather
than an external trainer.6
4. Results
4.1 Attendance and subjective evaluation
Is the local institution able to offer a business training programme
in-house that attracts the clients and is perceived as beneficial to them?
To study this question, we consider attendance rates and the participants’
subjective evaluation of the course.
Figure 1 gives an overview of attendance over time for the two groups. As
we have already reported in our discussion of the randomisation procedure,
the two groups had similar levels of attendance in the first and second ses-
sions, but the attendance in the internally trained group clearly dropped
below the attendance in the externally trained group in later sessions. On
average, the clients in the externally trained group attended 13.0 sessions
and the clients in the internally trained group attended thirteen sessions.
There is also a large difference in the share that received a diploma (which
required attending at least ten sessions), 90 versus 66.6%.
Given that the internal training and the external training took place at
different times of day, one might worry that the timing itself may affect
the ability to turn up at the training. For example, it might be more diffi-
cult to attend training in the afternoon than in the morning. To investigate
6 As a robustness check, we have also calculated propensity score matching estimates, and
they are in line with the treatment effects that are reported in the paper.
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this possibility, we collected data on loan meeting attendance, but we did
not find any difference in attendance at loan meetings between the time
slots assigned to external training and the time slot assigned to internal
training (t-test of equality, p ¼ 0.32).
Low attendance may be an indication of the internal training being of
lower quality, and in the follow-up study we asked the entrepreneurs how
much they had benefited from the course. This was reported on a scale
from 1 to 10, where 1 indicated no benefit at all and 10 indicated that
they had benefited a lot. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the subjective
evaluations, where we observe that the majority of participants perceive
the course to be beneficial, both in the externally trained group and in the
internally trained group. At the same time, we observe large differences
between the two groups. The average score is 9 in the externally trained
group and 7.6 in the internally trained group, and there is also a large differ-
ence in the share of participants reporting the top score (54.9 versus 21.3%).
Tables 2 and 3 confirm the impressions from Figures 1 and 2, respectively,
and report precisely estimated causal effects of being assigned to an internal
trainer rather than an external trainer. Both the attendance and subjective
evaluation of the course are significantly lower in the internally trained
group than in the externally trained group, and these effects are statistically
highly significant. We also observe that introducing covariates has a negli-
gible impact on the estimated internal training coefficient, which indicates
that the results are not driven by a lack of balance between the two groups.
Figure 1: Attendance per Session. Notes: The figure shows the share of participants in our
sample attending each of the sessions (3–21), by external training and internal training.
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In sum, we find that the course offered by the internal trainers was less
well received by the entrepreneurs; the internal training had lower attend-
ance and was perceived as less beneficial. We now turn to a study of
whether the asymmetry in quality is also reflected in long-term outcomes
for the entrepreneurs.
4.2 Long-term outcomes
We investigate long-term outcomes in two steps. First, we investigate the
impact on the business knowledge of the entrepreneurs; second, we inves-
tigate the impact on their overall situation. Ideally, for the latter, we would
like to include detailed business and household data, but such data are not
available for the internally trained group. Thus, in studying the long-term
effect on their overall situation, we have to restrict ourselves to general self-
reported evaluations from the entrepreneurs.
We conducted a business knowledge test, where the entrepreneurs were
tested in their understanding of the profit concept. They were introduced
to the case of Juma, who makes fruit juice at Kimara, Dar es Salaam, and
Figure 2: Subjective Evaluation. Notes: The figure shows the participants’ subjective evalu-
ation of how much they benefited from the course, by internal training and external train-
ing. Each bin in the figure shows the proportion of participants who reported this value,
where the course evaluation scale ranged from1 (not benefited at all) to 10 (benefited a lot).
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sells it in plastic containers to grocery stores and restaurants in different
parts of the city. The entrepreneurs were given the task of deciding
which expenses to include when calculating the profit of Juma’s business.
They were given a list of different expenses, including irrelevant expenses
like school fees and relevant expenses like payment for posters to advertise
the juice.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the scores, where we observe a clear
difference between the two groups; the average score was 81.7% for the ex-
ternally trained group versus 75.7% for the internally trained group. And
whereas 25.3% of the entrepreneurs in the externally trained group correct-
ly identified all the cost items, only 12.8% did so in the internally trained
group. Thus, the externally trained group showed significantly better
understanding of the profit concept than the internally trained group,
which we take as evidence of a difference in their knowledge of how to
run a business. Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 4 show that the causal
effect of having an internal trainer instead of an external trainer is precisely
estimated both with and without covariates. We also note that the score on
the test is significantly correlated with the entrepreneur’s level of education,
Table 2: Attendance and Diploma
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attendance Attendance Diploma Diploma
Internal 22.714** (1.067) 22.569** (1.025) 20.239*** (0.080) 20.237*** (0.078)
Education 0.136 (0.120) 20.003 (0.008)
Age 0.045 (0.034) 20.000 (0.002)
Female 20.905 (0.605) 20.017 (0.039)
Loan size 20.001 (0.001) 20.000 (0.000)
Branch 0.700 (0.603) 0.025 (0.041)
Constant 15.714*** (0.291) 13.545*** (2.111) 0.900*** (0.018) 0.955*** (0.143)
Observations 349 349 349 349
Notes: Attendance is the number of sessions (1–21) in which the clients participated.
Diploma is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the participants attended ten sessions
or more, thereby qualifying for a diploma awarded at the graduation ceremony. Internal is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the training is provided by internal trainers and 0
if the training is provided by external trainers. Education is the number of years of
schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. Female is a dummy variable with a value of
1 if the participant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand
Tanzanian shillings. Branch is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the branch is
Magomeni and 0 if it is Buguruni. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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which suggests that the test does indeed capture the entrepreneur’s level of
human capital.
To compare the wider impact of the training, we asked the entrepreneurs
to evaluate their situation more broadly. Specifically, we asked them four
questions on self-reported happiness: how happy they were with life in
general, with their economic situation, with their situation as entrepre-
neurs and with their family situation. The reason for this broad set of ques-
tions was that we wanted to capture the possibility that the course had an
impact not only on the performance of their businesses, but also potential-
ly on their life situation in general, including family issues. One could, for
example, imagine that the course could be beneficial both for monitoring
household expenses and, for females in particular, in strengthening their
bargaining power in the household.
For each dimension, the participants were asked to report a score from 1
(very unhappy) to 5 (very happy). Not surprisingly, the individual
responses across dimensions are highly correlated and the pattern when
comparing the externally trained group and the internally trained group
is the same for each dimension. Thus, we focus on the average self-reported
Table 3: Benefit of Training
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit Benefit Max benefit Max benefit
Internal 21.438***
(0.282)
21.417*** (0.286) 20.336***
(0.061)
20.322*** (0.061)
Education 0.040 (0.039) 0.015 (0.012)
Age 0.012 (0.011) 0.007** (0.003)
Female 20.117 (0.186) 20.067 (0.057)
Loan size 20.000 (0.000) 20.000 (0.000)
Branch 0.078 (0.192) 0.005 (0.054)
Constant 9.034***
(0.099)
8.454*** (0.676) 0.549***
(0.030)
0.210 (0.192)
Observations 315 315 315 315
Notes: Benefit is a self-reported score of how much the entrepreneur benefited from the
course (1–10), Max benefit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the entrepreneur
self-reported the top score (10). Internal is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
training is provided by internal trainers and 0 if the training is provided by external trai-
ners. Education is the number of years of schooling. Age is expressed in number of years.
Female is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the participant is a female. Loan size
denotes the loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Branch is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the branch is Magomeni and 0 if it is Buguruni.
Standard errors clustered at the loan group are in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p, 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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score for each entrepreneur. As shown in Figure 4, the externally trained
entrepreneurs are clearly happier with their situation than the internally
trained entrepreneurs, and, as shown in regressions (3) and (4) in
Table 4, this difference is precisely estimated with and without covariates.
We also observe that the younger entrepreneurs are happier than the older
entrepreneurs, which is in line with findings in the literature on happiness
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008).
In sum, the follow-up study shows systematic differences between the
externally trained group and the internally trained group in the long-term
outcomes. Entrepreneurs in the externally trained group have more
business knowledge and are more satisfied with their overall situation
than entrepreneurs in the internally trained group.
5. Concluding remarks
Field experiments in poor countries have improved our understanding of
the causal mechanisms at work in the development process. At the same
time, from a policy perspective, there has been a lack of focus on how
these research projects can be taken further and particularly on the
Figure 3: Business Knowledge. Notes: The figure shows the participants’ performance on a
business knowledge test, by internal training and external training. Each bin in the figure
shows the fraction of participants with this score, where the score is measured as percent-
age of correct answers.
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extent to which they can be implemented and scaled up by local stake-
holders. In this paper, we have discussed these challenges in the light of
a recent field experiment in Tanzania, where our research team organised
a business training programme for a group of entrepreneurs in the micro-
finance institution PRIDE.
As part of this research project, we also implemented a capacity-building
component to assist PRIDE in scaling up the programme by using internal
resources. In particular, local credit officers were trained by professional
instructors, and subsequently trained a subset of the clients. To evaluate
this local version of the intervention, we randomly assigned entrepreneurs
to external trainers or internal trainers. Our analysis shows that the internal
training programme systematically performed worse than the external
training programme. The internal training programme attracted lower
attendance, was considered less beneficial by the entrepreneurs and was
less effective in increasing the human capital of the entrepreneurs and
improving their overall situation. We believe that this provides an import-
ant lesson to the present literature on field experiments in developing
Table 4: Knowledge and Happiness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Knowledge Knowledge Happiness Happiness
Internal 20.054** (0.027) 20.056** (0.026) 20.225** (0.108) 20.208** (0.104)
Education 0.012*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.016)
Age 20.001 (0.001) 0.008** (0.004)
Female 20.024 (0.018) 20.012 (0.069)
Loan size 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Branch 0.025 (0.017) 20.140* (0.076)
Constant 0.811*** (0.009) 0.713*** (0.058) 4.186*** (0.041) 3.857*** (0.242)
Observations 315 315 315 315
Notes: Knowledge is the percentage of correct answers in the knowledge test. Happiness is
the average of the self-reported happiness on four dimensions (1–5). Eleven entrepreneurs
did not report on one of the four dimensions, and for themwe use the average of the three
other dimensions. The results are not sensitive to excluding these entrepreneurs. Internal is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the training is provided by internal trainers and 0
if the training is provided by external trainers. Education is the number of years of
schooling. Age is expressed in number of years. Female is a dummy variable with a value of
1 if the participant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand
Tanzanian shillings. Branch is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the branch is
Magomeni and 0 if it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at the loan group in are
parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p, 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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countries. It shows that the impact of external research projects most likely
represents an upper bound of what would be the impact if such projects
were to be scaled up by a local organisation.
This certainly has implications for the second question that we raised in
the introduction, namely whether the local institution should implement
such a training programme. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
answer this question in detail, but let us still highlight some of the critical
issues involved in this decision. First, even though we have shown that the
effect of the internal training programme is weaker than that of the external
training programme, we have not provided evidence of whether the intern-
al training programme overall had a positive impact on the entrepreneurs.
To do this, we would need a control group receiving no training that could
be compared with the internally trained group. An extensive evaluation of
the internally trained group was not part of the initial research project, and
thus no control group was established.7 In Berge et al. (2011), we show that
Figure 4: Self-reported Happiness. Notes: The figure shows the participants’ happiness, by
internal training and external training. Happiness is the average of the self-reported hap-
piness on four dimensions. Eleven entrepreneurs did not report on one of the four dimen-
sions, and for them we use the average in the other three dimensions. Each bin in the
figure shows the proportion of participants that reported this level of happiness, where
the scale is from 1 (very unhappy) to 5 (very happy).
7 To be able to compare the group assigned to internal training with the control group used
in the impact analysis of the external training in Berge et al. (2011), we would have needed
detailed data on the eligible clients in the internal group that did not attend training.
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the external training programme clearly had a positive impact on the
entrepreneurs, so we cannot rule out that even though the impact from
the internal training programme was weaker, the overall effect may still
be positive compared with not receiving training. Furthermore, one
cannot exclude the possibility that the quality of the internal training
would improve over time.
In addition to considering the impact for the entrepreneurs, a microfi-
nance institution would also have to study how beneficial the training pro-
gramme is for the organisation itself. By offering a training programme, a
microfinance institution could potentially obtain both better clients
(higher loan levels, fewer repayment problems) and more clients (existing
clients stay, training attracts new clients). But it also runs the risk of better
clients exiting the microcredit institution, since they may now have better
access to credit from other sources. Two years after the baseline study,
however, there is no evidence of (external) training affecting loan size,
exit rates or default rates. This suggests that, to the extent that training
has an impact on the financial sustainability of the institution, the
impact would come from the recruitment of new clients rather than
from existing clients.
Offering a business training programme is costly. Indeed, the variable
cost per participant of the externally provided training programme was
estimated to be about 100,000 TZS (USD 67). This covers compensation
to the trainers, as well as expenses related to providing teaching materials
and soft drinks to the participants. These costs would be lower if using
internal trainers, and thus the cost–benefit analysis of using external
versus internal trainers is not straightforward. The use of internal trainers
certainly reduces costs, but, as we have documented, also seems to reduce
the impact of such a training programme. We do not have detailed data on
the costs of internal trainers, and thus we cannot elicit more details on this
trade-off.
A relevant question for the microfinance institution, when considering
whether to offer training in-house or not, is whether at least part of
their costs can be covered by a participation fee. How much are entrepre-
neurs willing to pay for such a training programme? In a follow-up survey
conducted in mid-2009, we asked both the externally trained and the un-
trained entrepreneurs a hypothetical question on the willingness to pay for
such a training programme. Specifically, we asked them: ‘Imagine that you
were given the opportunity to participate in a 20-session (with 60 minutes
per session) entrepreneurship training course catered to your level. What is
the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per session?’ It is
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well-known that one should interpret such responses with care, since they
may reflect strategic reasoning and not reveal the underlying true prefer-
ences for receiving training. Still, we find it interesting that the median self-
reported willingness to pay in both the untrained group and the externally
trained group was 20,000 TZS (approximately USD 13), which is one-fifth
of the estimated cost of offering such a course using the external trainers.
Presumably, however, PRIDE can organise the course cheaper in-house.
Our numbers therefore indicate that it may be possible for PRIDE to
cover a significant part of its costs through participation fees.
Our study highlights the importance of investigating the local capacity
and local willingness to build on the lessons from a research-driven field
experiment. Further research is clearly needed in this area to ensure that
not only researchers but also the local communities benefit from the
many important field experiments presently conducted in developing
countries.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Treatment–Control Balance (Follow-up Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Internal group External group Difference
Female 0.60 (0.03) 0.60 (0.07) 0.61 (0.03) 20.01 (0.08)
Age 39.12 (0.45) 37.00 (1.04) 39.49 (0.54) 22.05* (1.35)
Loan size 746.03 (13.42) 729.79 (34.93) 748.88 (14.55) 219.09 (37.70)
Education 7.83 (0.12) 7.96 (0.35) 7.80 (0.13) 0.16 (0.34)
Branch 0.49 (0.03) 0.46 (0.07) 0.50 (0.03) 20.03 (0.08)
Observations 315 47 268
Notes: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variablewith a value of 1 if the
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size
in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of
schooling. Branch is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the branch is Magomeni and 0
if it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at the loan group are in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p, 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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Table A2: Attrition Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Interviewed sample Attrition sample Difference
Female 0.61 (0.03) 0.60 (0.03) 0.70 (0.08) 0.10 (0.09)
Age 39.20 (0.45) 39.12 (0.48) 39.94 (1.10) 20.82 (1.51)
Loan size 753.01 (12.74) 746.03 (13.42) 817.65 (39.49) 271.61* (42.85)
Education 7.82 (0.12) 7.83 (0.12) 7.77 (0.35) 0.06 (0.39)
Branch 0.49 (0.03) 0.49 (0.03) 0.50 (0.09) 20.01 (0.09)
Observations 349 315 34
Notes: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variablewith a value of 1 if the
participant is a female. Age is expressed in number of years. Loan size denotes the loan size
in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of
schooling. Branch is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the branch is Magomeni
and 0 if it is Buguruni. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
Table A3: Predicting Attrition
(1) (2)
Internal training 20.128** (0.052) 20.130** (0.052)
Education 0.001 (0.007)
Age 20.001 (0.001)
Female 20.035 (0.031)
Loan size 20.000 (0.000)
Branch 20.014 (0.032)
Constant 0.924*** (0.017) 1.067*** (0.095)
Observations 349 349
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the client was
reached in the follow-up study. Education is the number of years of schooling. Age is
expressed in number of years. Female is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the par-
ticipant is a female. Loan size denotes the loan size in PRIDE in 2008, in thousand
Tanzanian shillings. Branch is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the branch is
Magomeni and 0 if it is Buguruni. Standard errors clustered at the loan group are in
parentheses.
*p, 0.10, **p , 0.05, ***p, 0.01.
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Abstract  
Using   a   laboratory   experiment,   we   investigate   the   effect   of   gender   composition   on   the  
group  dynamics  of  microfinance  clients  in  Tanzania.  We  focus  on  three  dimensions:  i)  the  
willingness   to   cooperate   in   a   public-­‐‑good   game,   ii)   the   ability   to   cooperate   in   problem  
solving,   and   iii)   joint   decision  making   in   risk   taking.  We   find   that   gender   composition  
shapes  group  dynamics.  In  problem  solving,  we  find  female  groups  outperform  male  and  
mixed  groups,   even  though  males  at   the   individual   level  outperform   females.  Moreover,  
the  proportion  of  female  groups  that  take  risks  is  significantly  higher  than  that  found  in  
male  and  mixed  groups.  However,  we  find  no  differences  in  the  contribution  to  the  public  
good  between  the  female  groups  and  the  other  groups.  
  
Keywords:  group  composition,  gender,  microfinance,  laboratory  experiment  
  
  
_______________  
We  would   like   to   thank  Kjetil  Bjorvatn,  Bertil  Tungodden,  Erik  Ø.  Sørensen  and  Alexander  Cappelen   for   their  
useful   comments   and   suggestions.   We   have   also   benefited   from   comments   and   suggestions   by   seminar  
participants  at   the  Bergen  Econometrics  Group  and  the  Bergen  Seminar   in  Development  Economics  held  at   the  
Chr.  Michelsen  Institute  (CMI)  and  delegates  at  the  Asia  Pacific  Economic  Science  Association  (APESA)  Meeting  
and   the   2011   Centre   for   the   Study   of   African   Economies   (CSAE)   conference.   We   gratefully   acknowledge   the  
financial   support   of   the   CMI,   the   Vilhelm  Keilhau   Foundation   and   the   Research   Council   of  Norway,   and   the  
research  support  of  Promotion  of  Rural  Initiative  and  Development  Enterprises  (PRIDE,  Tanzania)  and  Research  
on  Poverty  Alleviation  (REPOA,  Tanzania)   in   the   implementation  of   the  experiment.  We  express  our  particular  
gratitude   to   Hermenegild   Kiyagi   and   Antusa   Felix   Massawe   at   PRIDE   Buguruni   for   assistance   and   fruitful  
discussions  and  to  Juda  Lyamai  and  the  team  for  excellent  research  assistance.  
33
  “Loan  group  composition  should  be  based  on  gender;  once  you  
have  a  man  in  a  group  of  women,  there  is  a  problem.”  
–  A  female  member  of  a  loan  group  
  
1.  Introduction  
Group   lending   is  a  key  element   in  microfinance.  This   is  because  as  a   substitute   for  
physical  or  financial  collateral,  microfinance  institutions  typically  require  borrowers  
to  form  joint  liability  groups,  mostly  consisting  of  about  five  people  (Armendáriz  de  
Aghion  and  Murdoch,   2010).  However,  while   joint   liability   is   considered   crucial   in  
reducing   transaction   costs   and   risk   for   creditors,   thus   allowing   the   poor   to   access  
loans  at  reasonable  interest  rates,  it  clearly  poses  some  challenges  for  borrowers.  For  
instance,   Madajewicz   (2011)   argues   that   one   source   of   tension   is   that   more  
progressive  group  members  may  be  held  back  by  less  progressive  group  members,  as  
the  latter  may  be  unwilling  to  accept  the  responsibility  for  larger  loans  by  their  fellow  
members.  
The  fact  that  most  borrowers  prefer  individual  loans  to  group  loans  is  one  indicator  
of   the   costs   of   group   lending   (Armendáriz   de   Aghion   and   Murdoch,   2010).   For  
example,  in  an  evaluation  of  the  dropout  rate  in  several  microfinance  institutions  in  
Tanzania,  Maximambali  et  al.  (1999)  reported  that  problems  with  cooperation  in  loan  
groups  was  actually  an   important  motivation   for  dropping  out.   It   is   then  clearly   in  
the  interests  of  microfinance  institutions  to  promote  positive  group  dynamics  among  
their  clients,  both   to  reduce   the  dropout  rate  and  to  stimulate  business  growth  and  
the  demand  for  larger  loans.  In  this  regard,  gender  composition  may  be  one  possible  
determinant  of  group  dynamics.  
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It   is  well  established  that  there  are  systematic  gender  differences  in  preferences,  for  
instance,  in  the  willingness  to  take  risks  and  to  compete,  and  that  males  and  females  
react  differently   to   institutional  settings   (see,  e.g.,  Croson  and  Gneezy,  2009).  These  
differences  may  make  cooperation  and  joint  decision  making  more  difficult  in  mixed-­‐‑
gender   loan  groups.  Moreover,   in  male-­‐‑dominated   societies,  males   are   expected   to  
lead,  speak  and  decide,  while  females  are  expected  to  comply,  even  though  they  may  
have  more  knowledge  that  is  relevant  or  a  higher  degree  of  competence  (Feinstein  et  
al.,   2010).   These   tensions   can   make   female   borrowers   prefer   single-­‐‑gender   loan  
groups,   as   indicated   by   the   opening   quote   in   this   article.   However,   males   and  
females  may  have  different  skills  and  could  thus  complement  each  other,  so  it  is  not  
obvious  that  the  costs  of  cooperation  in  loan  groups  outweigh  the  benefits.  
In   this   paper,   we   analyze   the   impact   of   gender   composition   on   group   dynamics  
among   microfinance   clients   in   Tanzania.   We   explore   three   dimensions   of   group  
dynamics:   the  willingness   to   cooperate,   the   ability   to   cooperate,   and   joint   decision  
making.  Willingness  to  cooperate  is  measured  by  a  standard  public-­‐‑good  game  while  
the   ability   to   cooperate   is   measured   by   groups   solving   multiple-­‐‑choice   questions.  
Joint  decision  making  is  measured  by  groups  making  a  common  decision  on  a  risky  
choice.   The   impact   of   gender   composition   on   all   three   dimensions   is  measured   by  
allocating  participants  randomly  to  either  mixed  or  single-­‐‑gender  groups.  
Our  experimental  design  is  novel,  because  we  study  group  cooperation  and  decision  
making  by   letting   group  members   communicate   freely   face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face,  whereas   to   the  
best  of  our  knowledge,   communication  and  decision  making   in  previous   economic  
laboratory   studies   of   group   behavior   have   taken   place   via   computers   or   voting  
devices   (for   example,   Ertac   and  Gurdal,   2012,   and  Masclet,   2009).  Our  design   thus  
enables   us   to   measure   the   ability   to   cooperate,   in   addition   to   the   willingness   to  
cooperate,  which  is  the  standard  measure  in  the  literature  when  discussing  how  well  
groups  cooperate.  
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Moreover,   although  many  existing   studies  discuss  gender   issues  and  microfinance,  
very   little  work   has   been   done   on   the   role   of   gender   composition   in   loan   groups.  
Some  exceptions  are  Anthony  and  Horne  (2003)  and  Sharma  and  Zeller  (1997),  who  
report   that   repayment  performance   improves  with   the   share  of   females   in   the   loan  
group,  while  Wydick  (1999)  finds  that  gender  heterogeneity  impacts  negatively  upon  
informal   insurance   provision   in   loan   groups.   However,   these   studies   merely  
illustrate   correlations   between   gender   group   composition   and   group   outcomes,  
without  any  strong  argument  for  causality.  
In   different   settings,   the   literature   on   the   impact   of   gender   composition   on   group  
outcomes   indicates   inconclusive   results.   In   a   business-­‐‑game   study   of   students,  
Apesteguia   et   al.   (2012)   show   that   both  mixed   and  male   teams   outperform   female  
teams.   Conversely,   Fenwick   and   Neal   (2001),   in   examining   student   group  
performance   in   a   business   strategy   game,   conclude   that   groups   may   be   more  
effective  when   the   number   of   women   outnumber   or   at   least   equal   the   number   of  
men.  Elsewhere,  both  Smith  et  al.  (2006)  and  Ahern  and  Ditmarr  (2012)  consider  the  
impact   of   gender   composition   of   corporate   boards,   with   the   former   concluding,  
unlike   the   latter,   that   the   inclusion  of   females  may   improve   firm  performance.   In  a  
laboratory   experiment,  Dufwenberg   and  Muren   (2006)   find   that   female-­‐‑dominated  
groups   behave   differently,   and   conclude   that   groups   are   more   generous   and  
egalitarian  when  females  are  in  the  majority,  although  female-­‐‑only  groups  tend  to  be  
less   generous.   Finally,   in   a   development   setting,   Chattopadhyay   and   Duflo   (2004)  
find  that  female  leadership  in  village  councils  in  India  influences  the  kinds  of  public  
goods  provided.  
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Our   study   shows   that   gender   composition  may   be   very   important   for   cooperation  
and  decision  making  in  groups.  We  find  that  group  composition  matters  only  for  the  
ability   to   cooperate,   not   the   willingness   to   do   so.   In   fact,   female-­‐‑only   groups  
outperform  both  male  and  mixed-­‐‑gender  groups  in  practical  problem  solving,  even  
though   females   individually   perform   much   poorer   than   males,   while   there   is   no  
effect   of   group   composition   on   contributions   to   the   public   good.   In   joint   decision  
making,  we  find  that  female-­‐‑only  groups  are  more  inclined  to  take  risks  than  either  
male  or  mixed  groups.  
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  experimental  context  and  
design,   followed   in  Section  3  by  an  explanation  of   the  empirical   strategy.  Section  4  
presents  the  results,  followed  in  Section  5  by  a  discussion  and  the  findings  from  the  
focus  group  discussions.  Section  6  provides  some  concluding  remarks.  
2.  Experimental  context  and  design  
The   experiment   was   conducted   in   October   2010   at   the   premises   of   Research   on  
Poverty   Alleviation   (REPOA),   a   research   institute   in   Dar   es   Salaam,   Tanzania.  
Participants  were  recruited  from  among  the  microcredit  clients  of   the  Promotion  of  
Rural   Initiative   and   Development   Enterprises   (PRIDE)   Tanzania,   the   country’s  
largest  microfinance   institution   (MFI).   The   participants’   ages   ranged   from   21   to   68  
years,  with  an  average  age  of  36  years.  Of  the  229  participants,  129  were  female  and  
100   male.   Around   75%   had   completed   primary   education:   i.e.,   seven   years   of  
schooling.  In  a  field  experiment  of  microfinance  clients  from  the  same  MFI,  Berge  et  
al.  (2012)  report  that  most  clients  operate  small-­‐‑scale,  nonregistered  businesses  with  
just  a  few  employees,  typically  small  kiosks  or  restaurants,  with  a  daily  profit  in  the  
range  of  10–20  US  dollars  (USD).  
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The   experiment   was   conducted   as   follows.   We   invited   309   PRIDE   clients   to   a  
“Workshop  on  Microfinance  and  Entrepreneurship”  where  they  would  earn  money,  
of  which  229  attended.  We  conducted  six  sessions  with  different  clients,  each  lasting  
approximately  three  hours.  The  experiment  was  single  blind.  The  sessions  consisted  
of  two  parts:  the  first  part  comprised  individual  games,  and  the  second  part  included  
group  games.  Individual  games  were  those  in  which  the  participants  made  decisions  
on   their   own,   without   the   cooperation   or   influence   of   other   participants.   Group  
games  refer  to  those  in  which  participants  made  decisions  in  conjunction  with  other  
participants.  
In   the   individual   part,   participants   played   a   problem-­‐‑solving   game,   two   decision-­‐‑
making  games   involving   a   risky   investment,   a  dictator   game,   and   finally   a  public-­‐‑
good   game.1   These   games  were   played   independently   of   each   other.   In   the   group  
part,  participants  were  allocated  randomly  to  single-­‐‑  or  mixed-­‐‑gender  groups  of  four  
persons,   where   they   worked   together   in   a   problem-­‐‑solving   game   and   a   decision-­‐‑
making   game.2   Because   the   participants  were   allocated   to   single-­‐‑gender   or  mixed-­‐‑
gender   groups   on   a   random   basis,   we   were   able   to   establish   causal   relationships  
between  gender  composition  and  the  outcomes  of  interest.  
The  mixed  groups  consisted  of  two  females  and  two  males.  If  there  were  not  enough  
participants  to  form  a  complete  group  of  four,  or  if  the  gender  composition  did  not  fit  
with  the  intended  group  composition,  we  still  asked  the  participants  to  perform  the  
task  in  the  problem-­‐‑solving  and  decision-­‐‑making  games,  but  excluded  these  groups  
from   the   analysis.   As   a   result,   only   the   data   from   52   groups   (204   persons)   were  
eligible   for   further  analysis.  Of   these,  22  groups  were  mixed,  12  were  male,  and  18  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Instructions  were  given  in  Kiswahili.  See  the  appendix  for  the  English  translation.  
2  When  the  participants  entered  the  session,  they  received  a  tag  with  their  ID  number.  A  duplicate  of  
this   tag  was   placed   in   one   of   two   boxes   depending   on   the   participant’s   gender.   In   three   of   the   six  
sessions,  we  formed  mixed  gender  groups  by  picking  two   identity  numbers   from  a  “Male”  box  and  
two   from  a   “Female”   box   to   form  one   group.   In   the   other   three   sessions,  we   formed   single   gender  
groups  by  picking  either  four  identity  numbers  from  the  “Male”  box,  or  four  from  the  “Female”  box.  
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were   female.   The   same   groups  were  maintained   for   both   the   problem-­‐‑solving   and  
decision-­‐‑making  games.  
In   the   individual   problem-­‐‑solving   game,   participants   were   asked   to   answer   10  
multiple-­‐‑choice  questions,  related  to  both  business  and  other  topics.  For  each  correct  
answer,  the  client  received  150  Tanzanian  Shillings  (TZS),  approximately  equal  to  10  
US   cents.3   After   this,   the   participants   were   allocated   randomly   to   groups   of   four.  
Each   group   had   to   cooperate   in   answering   10   similar   questions,   with   each   group  
handing  in  a  single  answer  sheet,  and  where  the  only  difference  was  that  the  payoff  
was  multiplied  by  four  to  keep  individual  stakes  constant.  In  contrast,   in  the  group  
game,   participants   sat   around   a   table   and   could   freely   communicate   with   other  
members  of   their  group.4   It  was  also  made  clear   that   the  amount   the  group  earned  
would  be  shared  equally  among  the  group  members.  
The  risk  games  were  conducted  in  a  similar  way,  with  identical  individual  and  group  
games.  Participants  on  an  individual  basis  first  had  to  make  two  decisions  involving  
risk.  In  the  first  round,  clients  could  either  make  a  safe  investment,  from  which  they  
would  with  certainty  receive  1,000  TZS,  or  they  could  gamble  and  receive  either  0  or  
2,500  TZS  with  equal  probability.  In  the  second  round,  the  safe  bet  was  increased  to  
1,500  TZS,  with  the  gamble  left  unchanged.  
In   the   group  decision  game,   the   same  procedure  was  used   for   each   round  played,  
with   the   only   difference   being   that   the   payoff  was  multiplied   by   four   to   keep   the  
individual   stakes   and   incentives   constant.5   Before   they  made   the   first   decision,  we  
communicated   to   the   participants   that   the   outcomes   of   the   lotteries   would   be  
determined  at  the  end  of  the  session  by  asking  one  of  the  participants  to  pick  one  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  As  a  comparison,  a  typical  meal  with  rice,  beans  and  meat  costs  approximately  1,500  TZS. 
4  Each  group  had  a  question  sheet  and  a  pen  to  record  responses  directly  on  the  sheet.  
5  We  do  not  use   the   result   from   the   second   round  of   the   risk  games   in  our  analysis  because  almost  
everyone  chose  the  safe  option  (48  of  the  52  groups).  
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two   envelopes,   of   which   one   contained   a   sheet   of   paper   that   read   “LUCKY”   and  
another  that  read  “UNLUCKY.”  
Between   the   individual   and   the   group   games   in   problem   solving   and   decision  
making,   we   conducted   a   dictator   game   and   a   public-­‐‑good   game.   In   the   dictator  
game,   participants   each   received   1,000   TZS   that   they   could   decide   to   either   keep  
themselves  or  share  with  another  PRIDE  client.  The  dictator  game  was  played  twice.  
The  dictators  in  one  round  were  told  that  the  recipient  was  a  male  in  the  session  and  
in  the  other  round  that  the  client  was  a  female.6  
In  the  public-­‐‑good  game,  we  allocated  participants  randomly  to  either  single-­‐‑gender  
or  mixed  groups  of  four.7  We  ensured  that  while  the  participants  were  made  aware  
of   their   group   composition,   they   could   not   identify   who   was   in   their   group   or  
cooperate  with   the  other  group  members.  Each  participant  received  an  endowment  
of   2,000   TZS,   which   could   either   be   kept   in   a   private   account   or   contributed   to   a  
group  fund.  Contributions  to  the  group  fund  were  doubled  and  then  shared  equally  
among  the  group  members.8  
A   few  weeks   after   the   experiment,   we   conducted   focus   group   discussions   (FGDs)  
with  participants  to  better  understand  the  dynamics  of  the  groups  in  the  laboratory  
experiment.   We   conducted   five   FGD   sessions,   two   each   with   male   and   female  
groups,  and  one  mixed  session,  all  consisting  of  7–9  participants.  The  participants  in  
the   mixed   FGDs   were   selected   randomly   from   participants   in   the   single-­‐‑gender  
FGDs.  In  total,  34  participants  took  part  in  the  FGDs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  The  order  of  the  two  dictator  games  was  varied  on  a  random  basis  to  avoid  systematic  differences.  
Contribution  rates  in  the  dictator  games  are  reported  in  Table  A1.  Participants  contributed  an  average  
of  440  TZS  to  males,  and  452  TZS  to  females,  from  an  allocation  of  1,000  TZS.  However,  this  difference  
in   contribution   between  males   and   females   is   not   significantly   different   from   zero.   This   also   holds  
when  we  disaggregate  by  gender,  and  we  see  that  contributions  are  very  similar  in  all  cases.  We  note  
that   contribution   rates   are  very  high   (40–47%).  We  use  average   contribution   rates   in   the  group  as  a  
control  variable  in  the  main  games. 
7  Participants  could  see  how  the  randomization  was  conducted.  
8  We  explained  the  game  thoroughly  by  conducting  role-­‐‑plays  with  research  assistants  as  models.	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3.  Empirical  strategy  
To  estimate  the  impact  of  group  composition  on  public-­‐‑good  contributions,  problem  
solving,  and  decision  making,  we  begin  by  estimating  the  following  equation:  
                          (1)  
where      is   the  group  outcome  of   interest;   that   is,   (i)   the   total   contributions  by   the  
group  in  the  public  good  game,  (ii)  the  number  of  problems  solved  correctly,  and  (iii)  
whether   or   not   the   group   decided   to   take   the   risk,   and   SingleGender   is   a   dummy  
variable  that  takes  a  value  of  one  if  the  group  consists  of  only  males  or  females,  and  
zero  otherwise.  Because  clients  were  allocated  randomly  to  either  single-­‐‑  or  mixed-­‐‑
gender  groups,     has  a  causal  interpretation  as  the  impact  of  gender  composition  on  
the  group  outcome  of  interest.  
We   also   include   a   set   of   control   variables, ,   in   our   regression   to   account   for  
potential  initial  differences  between  the  groups  by  estimating:  
                        (2)  
The  control  variables   include   the  group  average  of   loan  size   in  PRIDE,   the  average  
age  of  group  members,  the  average  contribution  in  the  dictator  game  as  a  measure  of  
altruism,  and  the  years  of  membership  in  PRIDE,  along  with  the  number  of   literate  
group  members.  In  addition,  we  control  for  total  individual  knowledge  and  the  total  
number  of  risk  takers  in  the  group  when  analyzing  the  impact  of  group  composition  
on  problem  solving  and  decision  making.  
Further,   because   we   wish   to   explore   the   impact   of   gender   composition   on   group  
dynamics,  we  include  the  interaction  term   and  estimate:  
               (3)  
1i i iY SingleGenderα β ε= + +
iY
1β
iX
1i i i iY SingleGenderα β δ ε= + + +X
i iSingleGenderMale
1 2i i i i iY SingleGender SingleGenderMaleα β β ε= + + +
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where      is   the   difference   in   the   outcome   of   interest   between   female   and   mixed  
groups,   while   +    captures   the   difference   between   male   and   mixed   groups.  
However,  we  should  interpret     with  care  as  the  estimated  coefficient  measures  the  
difference   between  male   and   female   groups,   and   should   therefore   not   be   given   a  
causal  interpretation,  given  an  individual  by  definition  cannot  belong  to  both  a  male  
and   a   female   group.  Note   that  we   do   not   need   to   include   a   term   for  male   in   our  
regression,   because   the   constant   term   𝛼   captures   mixed-­‐‑gender   groups,   while   the  
remaining  two  terms  capture  the  female  and  male  groups.  Finally,  we  also  included  
covariates  when  we  estimated  the  differences  between  the  groups:  
.            (4)  
We  estimate  regressions  (1)–(4)  by  applying  the  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  method  
when  we  study  the   impact  of  group  composition  on  public-­‐‑good  contributions  and  
problem  solving.  However,  we  use  a  probit  model  and  report  marginal  effects  when  
estimating  whether   groups   decide   to   gamble,   as   the   dependent   variable   is   binary.  
The   results   are   similar   to   those   obtained   with   OLS,   but   the   null   hypotheses   are  
rejected  at  slightly  weaker  significance  levels.  
4.  Results  
4.1.  Willingness  to  cooperate:  Public-­‐‑good  game  
Table   1   provides   descriptive   statistics   at   the   individual   level   for   the   public-­‐‑good  
game.   Participants   contributed   an   average   of   slightly   more   than   50%   of   their  
endowment  to  the  group  fund.  Females  contributed  an  average  of  1,101  TZS  from  a  
maximum  of  2,000  TZS,  while  males   contributed  943  TZS.  However,   the  difference  
between   males   and   females   is   far   from   statistically   significant.   We   also   note   that  
contributions  from  participants  in  mixed-­‐‑gender  groups  are  almost  identical  to  those  
from  participants   in  single-­‐‑gender  groups.  Table  2  provides  regression  results   from  
1β
1β 2β
2β
1 2i i i i i iY SingleGender SingleGenderMaleα β β δ ε= + + + +X
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the  public-­‐‑good  game  that  confirm  the  descriptive  evidence   in  Table  1.  Regressions  
(1)  and  (2)  in  Table  2  show  that  the  average  public-­‐‑good  contribution  is  not  affected  
by  whether  the  group  was  single  or  mixed  gender.9  In  addition,  regressions  (3)  and  
(4)   show   that   groups   consisting   only   of  males   do   not   contribute   differently   to   the  
public  good  compared  with  female  or  mixed  groups.  
4.2.  Ability  to  cooperate:  Problem-­‐‑solving  game  
The   individual   results   in   Figure   1   depict   the   distribution   of   the   number   of   correct  
answers   for   the   individual   problem-­‐‑solving   game   for   males   and   females,  
respectively.  We  can  see  that  males  are  more  often  placed  to  the  right  of  the  graph,  
indicating  that  males  achieve  higher  scores.  The  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  3  show  
that  males   correctly   answered   an   average   of   5.75   questions   from   the   10   questions,  
while  females  averaged  5.39  correct  answers  (t-­‐‑test,  p  =  0.01).  Examining  the  number  
of   correct  group  answers   in  Table  4,   the   findings  are   reversed,  with   female  groups  
achieving  0.79  more  correct  answers  than  male  groups  (t-­‐‑test,  p  =  0.05),  and  0.9  more  
correct  answers  compared  with  the  mixed  groups  (t-­‐‑test,  p  =  0.01).  To  investigate  this  
issue  further,  we  regressed  gender  group  composition  on  the  group  score.  
When  estimating  equation  (1),  we  can  see  from  the  results  of  regression  (1)  in  Table  5  
that   single-­‐‑gender   groups   (both   male   and   female)   achieved   0.59   more   correct  
answers   than   mixed   groups   (p   <   0.05).   In   regression   (2),   we   included   the   control  
variables,   and   can   see   that   the   impact   of   being   in   a   single-­‐‑gender   group   becomes  
slightly   stronger   (p   <   0.01).   From   regressions   (1)   and   (2),  we   conclude   that   single-­‐‑
gender  groups  perform  better  in  the  problem-­‐‑solving  test,  indicating  that  the  group  
dynamics  are  more  positive  in  such  groups.  To  explore  whether  this  result  is  driven  
mainly   by   female   or   male   groups,   we   include   the   interaction   term  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Note  that  these  groups  are  not   identical  to  those  used  in  the  problem-­‐‑solving  and  decision-­‐‑making  
games.   Further,   the   sample   in   the   public-­‐‑good   game   is   not   identical   to   the   sample   in   the   problem-­‐‑
solving  and  decision-­‐‑making  games.  This  is  because  we  conducted  two  separate  randomizations:  one  
for  the  public-­‐‑good  game  and  another  for  the  problem-­‐‑solving  and  decision-­‐‑making  games.  
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SingleGenderGroup*Male  in  the  regression,  as  reported  in  column  (3).  We  observe  that  
the  overall  effect  of  a  single-­‐‑gender  group  from  regressions  (1)  and  (2)  must  clearly  
be   driven   by   female   groups   performing   significantly   better   than   both   male   and  
mixed   groups   (significant   at   the   1%   level),   because   they   achieved   0.9  more   correct  
answers   than   the   mixed   groups   (p   <   0.01).   As   expected   from   the   size   of   the  
coefficients,   we   also   note   that   a   joint   significance   test   of   SingleGenderGroup   and  
SingleGenderGroup*Male   reveals   that   the   performance   of   the   male   groups   is   not  
significantly  different  from  that  of  mixed  groups.  In  regression  (4),  we  control  for  the  
covariates,  and  see  that  the  estimates  are  remaining  the  same.        
4.3.   Decisions  in  groups:  Risk  games  
The   individual   results   in  Figure   2   and  Table   6   indicate   that  males   and   females   are  
identical  at  the  individual  level  when  it  comes  to  taking  risks,  with  50%  of  both  males  
and   females   choosing   the   risky   option.   However,   from   the   group-­‐‑level   result   in  
Figure  2,  we  can  see  that  the  percentage  of  risk  takers  is  much  lower  among  male  and  
mixed   groups;   25%   of  male   groups   and   18%   of  mixed   groups   chose   to   take   risks  
compared  with  44%  of  female  groups.  Furthermore,  the  t-­‐‑tests  in  Table  7  indicate  that  
the  female  groups  are  significantly  less  risk  averse  than  the  mixed  groups  (at  the  10%  
level).  
Table  8  reports  the  regression  results  for  the  impact  of  group  composition  on  group  
risk  decisions.  From  regressions  (1)  and  (2),  we  can  see  that  single-­‐‑gender  groups  are  
no   more   likely   than   mixed   groups   to   choose   the   risky   option.   However,   in  
regressions  (3)  and  (4),  we  see  that  female  groups  are  25–26%  more  likely  than  mixed  
groups  to  choose  the  risky  option.  When  the  covariates  are  included,  the  coefficient  
of   interest   is   significant   at   the   5%   level,   and  when   not   included,   the   coefficient   is  
significant  at  the  10%  level.  Moreover,  in  regression  (4),  the  estimated  coefficient  for  
the   interaction   term   SingleGenderGroup*Male   is   also   significant,   but   negative.   This  
indicates   that   male   groups   take   less   risk   than   female   groups.   The   number   of   risk  
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takers   in   the   group   also   significantly   affects   the   group   outcome.   All   other   things  
being  equal,  the  more  risk  takers  in  a  group,  the  more  likely  the  group  is  to  choose  
the  risky  option.  
Finally,   t-­‐‑tests   show   that   female   groups   do   not   make   significantly   different   risk  
decisions   than   the  average  number  of   individual  decisions  among  group  members,  
while   male   and   mixed   groups   become   significantly   more   risk   averse   in   groups  
(significant  at  the  5%  and  1%  levels).  This  potentially  indicates  that  female  groups  are  
more  efficient  in  making  joint  decisions,  in  the  sense  that  joint  decisions  are  closer  to  
their  individual  choices.  
5.  Discussion  and  findings  from  the  focus  group  discussions  
In  the  previous  section,  we  saw  that  group  composition  might  be  very  important  for  
cooperation  and  decision  making   in  groups.  At   the   individual   level,  we   found   that  
females   are   less   able   than  males   to   respond   correctly.  However,  when   females   are  
included   in   groups  with   only   other   females,   we   found   that   they   outperform   both  
male  and  mixed  groups.  Female  groups  also  appear  to  employ  a  more  constructive  
group   process   than   male   groups   in   managing   to   better   utilize   their   members’  
capabilities.  If  this  reflects  a  more  general  pattern  for  loan  groups  in  microfinance,  it  
may  provide  one  reason  why  females  find  it  more  attractive  to  become  members  of  
microfinance   institutions;   they   manage   to   cooperate   well   and   can   handle   joint  
liability  schemes  in  a  constructive  way.  
Similar  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  risk  game.  At   the   individual   level,  both  
for  males   and   females,   there  was   an   equal   split   between  participants   choosing   the  
risky  and  the  safe  options.10  When  groups  decided  whether  to  gamble,  we  saw  that  in  
general  they  were  more  likely  than  individuals  were  to  play  it  safe,  because  only  15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  This  is  in  contrast  to  previous  research,  which  typically  shows  that  females  are  more  risk  averse  than  
males  (Croson  and  Gneezy,  2009).  
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of   the  52  groups  chose   the  risky  option.  Ertac  and  Gurdal   (2010)  and  Masclet  et  al.  
(2009)  concluded  a  similar  pattern,  and  suggest  that  there  is  a  shift  to  caution  when  
people  enter  a  group.  Because   females  are  often   found   to  be  more   risk  averse   than  
males   (Croson   and   Gneezy,   2009),   one   may   consider   that   female   groups   would  
likewise  be   relatively  hostile   toward   risk.  However,   this  does  not   appear   to  be   the  
case,  as  we  find  that  the  proportion  of  female  groups  that  take  risks  is  higher  than  the  
proportion   of   male   and   mixed   groups.   Nor   do   we   find   that   females   make  
significantly   different   choices   as   a   group   than   they   do   individually.   Thus,   the  
acceptance   of   risk   by   female   groups  may   be   the   reason  why   females   appear  more  
comfortable  than  males  with  group  loans.  
The   finding   that   female   groups   perform   better   in   the   problem-­‐‑solving   game   is  
probably  related  to   the   finding   in   the  decision-­‐‑making  game.  As  female  groups  are  
more   able   to  discuss   and  make   common  agreements   in   the  problem-­‐‑solving  game,  
the  fear  of  being  blamed  if  the  outcome  of  the  gamble  proves  to  be  negative  may  be  
less   important.   On   the   other   hand,   in   the   male   and   mixed-­‐‑gender   groups,   the  
atmosphere  may  be  less  inclusive,  and  groups  may  therefore  more  easily  choose  the  
no-­‐‑risk  option   if,   for  example,  one  member   is   reluctant   to  gamble.  However,  while  
we  find  that  group  composition  may  influence  the  ability  of  groups  to  cooperate  and  
solve  problems,  we  find  no  gender  differences  in  public-­‐‑good  contributions  between  
the   different   groups,   indicating   that   group   composition   does   not   influence   the  
willingness  to  cooperate.  
Our  main  findings  are  in  line  with  Kuhn  and  Villeval  (2011),  who  find  that  women  
prefer  cooperative  work  environments,  which  is  reasonable  if  they  are  in  fact  better  
cooperators   than  males,   as   our   study   also   suggests.  Our   results   are   also   consistent  
with   Booth   and  Nolen   (2012)   who   have   shown   that   girls   in   girls-­‐‑only   schools   are  
more   eager   to   compete   than  girls   in  mixed   schools,   indicating   that   the  presence  of  
males  may  alter  the  behavior  and  preferences  of  females.  
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Six  weeks   after   the   laboratory   experiment,  we   included  34  participants   in  FGDs   to  
shed   further   light  on   the   results   from   the  experiment  and   to  better  understand   the  
local  context.  We  conducted   five  sessions  of  FGDs,   two  each  with  male  and  female  
groups  and  one  mixed  session,  all  consisting  of  6–9  participants.  Several   interesting  
explanations  were  provided   concerning   the   cooperation  dynamics   in   the  male   and  
female  groups.  For  instance,  a  male  participant  said:  
There  is  a  Kiswahili  proverb:  “Two  bulls  do  not  stay  in  one  house.”  When  you  put  
men  together  there  is  always  a  tendency  for  them  to  disagree  with  each  other,  while  
females  on  the  other  hand  would  listen  to  each  other.  
This  quote  reflects   that   it  may  be  difficult   for  males   to  cooperate  and   listen   to  each  
other.   Another   male   pointed   out   that   women’s   general   lack   of   confidence   makes  
them  more  open  to  the  arguments  of  others:  
Women   lack   self-­‐‑confidence   and   this   helps   them   to   accept   ideas   and   suggestions  
from  other  females.  Unlike  women,  the  self-­‐‑confidence  of  males  makes  it  difficult  for  
them   to   accept   ideas   and   suggestions   from   each   other,   and   therefore   they   don’t  
perform  well  in  a  group.  
The  response  from  a  woman  in  another  session  indicates  that  the  lack  of  confidence  
observed  among   females   is   related   to   their   belief   that   they  have   a  disadvantage   in  
terms  of  education.  Hence,  working  together  is  seen  as  a  solution:  
  …  I  told  you  that  women  lack  experience  and  education;  therefore  it  is  more  useful  
for  them  to  work  in  groups  rather  than  independently.  
Discussing  gender  differences  in  groups,  a  male  participant   indicated  the  issue  that  
males  are  expected  to  make  decisions  when  placed  together  with  females:  
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Whenever   males   and   females   are   mixed   in   a   group,   females   tend   to   step   aside,  
assuming  that  males  are  supposed  to  lead,  even  when  the  male  is  inexperienced  in  
the  relevant  subject.  
Conversely,  a  female  participant  said  that  it  was  not  simply  about  females  stepping  
aside,  rather  that  male  arguments  are  heeded  to  a  greater  extent:  
In   most   cases   a   male’s   suggestion,   answer   or   idea   is   given   more   weight,   thus  
women  will  tend  to  listen  to  men.  
The  findings  from  the  focus  groups  indicate  that  in  mixed  groups,  females  step  aside  
and  let  the  males  decide.  Females  also  appear  to  lack  self-­‐‑confidence  and  assume  that  
males   are  more   knowledgeable.  Males,   on   the   other   hand,   tend   not   listen   to   each  
other   and   do   not   want   to   reveal   weakness.   However,   when   females   are   grouped,  
they  realize  that  four  heads  are  better  than  one,  and  in  our  games,  this  translates  into  
discussing  questions  more  openly  and  decisively  to  identify  the  correct  response  and  
by  making  decisions   that  suit   the  group  as  a  whole.  This   indicates   that   females  are  
dominated  by  males  in  group  settings,  thereby  effectively  constraining  females  from  
fully  utilizing  their  knowledge  and  ability  to  cooperate.  
6.  Concluding  remarks  
Previous  studies  on  gender  composition  and  microfinance,  such  as  those  in  Anthony  
and  Horne  (2003),  Sharma  and  Zeller  (1997)  and  Wydick  (1999),  have  found  that  loan  
groups  perform  better  in  terms  of  repayment  and  insurance  as  the  share  of  females  in  
the  group  increases.  In  line  with  these  findings,  our  experimental  evidence  indicates  
that   females   indeed   perform   better   and   behave   differently  when   cooperating  with  
other  females,  suggesting  males  may  constrain  females  if  they  are  placed  together  in  
the  same  group.  Our  findings  then  potentially  shed  light  on  the  mechanism  driving  
the  relatively  poor  performance  of  mixed-­‐‑gender  groups  in  microfinance.  
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Female   groups   initially   outperformed  more-­‐‑knowledgeable   males   in   the   problem-­‐‑
solving  game,  while  groups  consisting  of  females  took  more  risks  than  mixed-­‐‑gender  
groups.   Hence,   gender   composition   may   be   important   for   loan   group   dynamics,  
which   is   clearly   important   for   social   impact   and   the   financial   sustainability   of  
microfinance   institutions.   For   this   reason,   MFIs   that   allow   mixed-­‐‑gender   groups  
should  place  more  effort  into  monitoring  the  group  dynamics  because  placing  males  
in   female   groups  may   reduce   the   group’s   ability   to   cooperate,  which   in   turn  may  
eventually  transmit  into  repayment  problems.  
As  our  findings  suggest  that  females  are  more  able  to  cooperate  than  males  and  that  
the  presence  of  males  may  disturb   the  dynamics  of   female  groups,  our   results  also  
shed  light  on  the  female  dominance  in  microfinance.  Females  may  then  not  only  be  
targeted   (for   good   reason)   by   the   MFIs,   they   may   also   be   more   attracted   by   the  
cooperative   setting   in   group   lending   than   males,   at   least   as   long   as   they   can  
cooperate   with   other   females.   Finally,   our   study   also   contributes   more   general  
insights   into  the  literature  on  gender  differences   in  preferences.   In  particular,  while  
males   are   often   found   to   be   more   eager   to   compete   than   females   (Croson   and  
Gneezy,  2009),  our  findings  are  consistent  with  those  in  Kuhn  and  Villeval  (2011)  that  
women   prefer   environments   where   skills   in   cooperation   are   relatively   more  
important  than  the  eagerness  to  compete.  
Of  course,  while  our  findings  suggest  female  groups  perform  best,  we  were  unable  to  
identify  the  mechanisms  that  enable  males  to  effectively  constrain  females  in  groups.  
As   identified   in   the   FGDs,   the   lack   of   confidence   of   women   and   the   heightened  
attention   given   to   the   views   of   men   are   possible   contenders.   Clarification   of   the  
mechanism  driving  these  group  gender  dynamics  requires  more  research.  
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Figures  and  Tables  
Figure 1: Gender, gender composition and problem solving 
 
 
Figure 2: Gender, gender composition and decision making 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of public-good game 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Total       
Contribution to Public Fund 208 1027.88 815.13 1000 0 2000 
       
By Gender       
Male Contribution to Public Fund  96 942.71 848.74 1000 0 2000 
Female Contribution to Public Fund  112 1100.89 781.60 1000 0 2000 
Difference   –158.18 (113.11)    
       
By Group Composition       
Contribution in Mixed Groups 88 1018.18 844.39 1000 0 2000 
Contribution in Same Gender Groups 120 1035.00 796.49 1000 0 2000 
Difference   –16.82 (114.67)    
This table reports the contribution in the public-good game. Participants were asked to distribute 2,000 TZS into 
either a private fund or a public fund. The first group of statistics details the average contribution across all 
participants. The second group of statistics provides the contributions when disaggregated by gender. The third 
group of statistics reports the contribution when disaggregated by group composition. Inferences employ t-tests. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Regressions results for public-good game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Average PG 
Contribution 
no covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
with covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
no covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
with covar. 
Single-Gender Group 16.82 49.93 95.05 111.58 
 (121.87) (118.88) (129.10) (128.85) 
Single-Gender Group*Male   –180.54 –144.05 
   (137.23) (124.42) 
Average Altruism  71.89**  71.29*** 
  (27.04)  (26.47) 
Average Loan Size  –1.57  –6.19 
  (30.52)  (30.38) 
Average Years with MFI  23.50  22.90 
  (33.99)  (32.94) 
Average Age  14.13  13.13 
  (12.54)  (13.48) 
Number of Literate Members  185.30  181.83 
  (181.88)  (184.53) 
Constant 1018.18*** –934.11 1018.18*** –855.47 
 (101.52) (899.36) (102.55) (944.00) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table provides the results of the OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the average of group 
member contributions into the public fund in the public-good game. The unit of observation is the group 
(consisting of four members). Single-Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a group is 
single gender and zero otherwise. Single-Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to capture male groups. 
Average Altruism measures the average contribution from the group members in the dictator game. Average 
Loan Size measures the average loan size of the four members in the group. Average Years with MFI is the 
average number of years of membership in PRIDE for the four members of the group. Number of Literate 
Members is the number of members able to read. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Number of correct answers, for individuals 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Total 208 5.39 1.70 6 1 9 
Male  92 5.75 1.79 6 1 9 
Female 116 5.11 1.57 5 1 8 
Difference Male–Female 0.64*** (0.23)    
This table reports the number of correct answers in the problem-solving game in the 
individual round, comprising 10 multiple-choice questions. Inferences employ t-tests. * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4: Number of correct answers, by group 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Total 52 7.88 0.87 8 6 10 
Male  12 7.66 0.65 8 7 9 
Female 18 8.44 0.78 8 7 10 
Mixed  22 7.54 0.86 7.5 6 9 
Difference Male–Mixed 0.12 (0.28)     
Difference Female–Mixed 0.90*** (0.26)     
Difference Male–Female –0.78** (0.27)    
This table reports the number of correct answers in the problem-solving game at the 
group stage, comprising 10 multiple-choice questions. Inferences employ t-tests. *p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
  
54
Table 5: Regression results for problem solving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Correct Answers 
no covar. 
Correct Answers 
with covar. 
Correct Answers 
no covar. 
Correct Answers 
with covar. 
Single-Gender Group 0.59** 0.78*** 0.90*** 1.07*** 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.26) (0.25) 
Single-Gender Group*Male   –0.78*** –0.75*** 
   (0.26) (0.27) 
Total Knowledge Endowment  0.03  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Average Loan Size  0.13*  0.10 
  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Average Years with MFI  0.09  0.08 
  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Average Age  –0.00  –0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Number of Literate Members  0.21  0.07 
  (0.29)  (0.28) 
Average Altruism  0.10  0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Constant 7.55*** 4.33*** 7.55*** 5.13*** 
 (0.18) (1.58) (0.18) (1.40) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table provides the results of the OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the number of questions 
a group was able to correctly answer (from 10 questions). The unit of observation is the group (consisting of 
four members). Single-Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a group is single gender 
and zero otherwise. Single-Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to capture male groups. Total Knowledge 
Endowment is the total number of correct answers in the individual knowledge test by all the members in the 
group. Average Loan Size is the average loan size of the four members in the group. Average Years with MFI is 
the average number of years of membership of PRIDE for the four members of the group. Number of Literate 
Members is the number of members able to read. Average Altruism is the average contribution from the group 
members in the dictator game. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 6: Proportion of risk takers, for individuals 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Total 208 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Male  92 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Female 116 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Difference Male–Female 0.00     
This table reports the proportion of individual participants that chose to take risks. 
Participants assigned a value of one if they took risks, zero otherwise. 
 
  
55
Table 7: Proportion of risk takers, by group 
 N Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Total 52 0.29 0.46 0 0 1 
Male  12 0.25 0.45 0 0 1 
Female 18 0.44 0.51 0 0 1 
Mixed  22 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
Difference Male–Mixed 0.07     
Difference Female–Mixed 0.26*     
Difference Male–Female –0.19     
This table reports the proportion of groups that chose to take risks in the decision-making 
game. Participants assigned a value of one if they took risks, zero otherwise. 
Inferences from Mann–Whitney tests. * z < 0.1, ** z < 0.05, ***z < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 8: Regression results for risk and decision making 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Risky Investment 
no covar. 
Risky Investment 
with covar. 
Risky Investment 
no covar. 
Risky Investment 
with covar. 
Single-Gender Group 0.18 0.20* 0.25* 0.26*** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
Single-Gender Group*Male   –0.16 –0.20*** 
   (0.13) (0.08) 
Number of Risk Takers  0.30***  0.30*** 
  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Average Loan Size  –0.07  –0.07 
  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Average Years with MFI  0.07  0.06 
  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Average Age  –0.00  –0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Number of Literate Members  –0.11  –0.12 
  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Average Altruism  0.02  –0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table provides the marginal effects using the probit estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the group decides to take a risk, and zero otherwise. The unit of observation is 
the group (consisting of four members). Single-Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a 
group is single gender and zero otherwise. Single-Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to capture male 
groups. Number of Risk Takers is the number of members in the group that take individual risks. Average Loan 
Size is average loan size of the four members in the group. Average Years with MFI is the average number of 
years of membership of PRIDE for the four members of the group. Number of Literate Members is the number of 
members able to read. Average Altruism is the average contribution from the group members in the dictator 
game. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of dictator game 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Total       
Amount sent to Male Recipient 229 439.96 246.57 500 0 1000 
Amount sent to Female Recipient 229 452.40 256.61 500 0 1000 
Difference  –12.44 (17.37)    
       
Sent by Male        
Amount sent to Male Recipient 100 440.50 245.74 500 0 1000 
Amount sent to Female Recipient 100 425.50 232.85 500 0 1000 
Difference  15.00 (22.02)    
       
Sent by Female       
Amount sent to Male Recipient 129 439.53 248.17 500 0 1000 
Amount sent to Female Recipient 129 473.25 255.72 500 0 1000 
Difference   –33.72 (25.59)    
This table reports the contribution in the dictator game. Participants were asked to share 1,000 TZS with 
another person. Each participant had to make this decision twice: once with a male and another with a female. 
The first group of statistics reports the average contribution of all participants to male and female recipients. 
The second group of statistics details average contributions by males. The third group of statistics reports the 
average contributions by females. Inferences employ t-tests. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Lab instructions 
[Before the session starts] 
[Moderator ensures that Overhead 1 (“Karibuni”) is on when participants enter room] 
[MODERATOR ensures that the participants follow the rules of conduct after entering the 
room]  
[When Moderator receives a sign from the Head of the Experiment (LHE), he starts reading the 
introduction] 
[The session] 
[Introduction] 
Welcome. We appreciate your willingness to participate in this session, which I will lead. In this 
session you will be asked to make some financial choices, and you will earn money based on your 
choices and your performance. 
The results from this session will be used in a research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. It 
is therefore very important that all of you follow certain rules of conduct. You are not allowed to talk 
to any of the other participants during the session. If you have any questions or need any help, please 
raise your hand and one of us will assist you. All cell-phones must be turned off and put away. If 
anyone does not follow these instructions, we will have to ask him or her to leave the workshop. 
If you need to go to the bathroom during the workshop, please raise your hand. Importantly, do not 
leave the room without permission. 
 [MODERATOR proceeds when HE gives signal]  
The session will be conducted under anonymity. It will not be possible for the other participants or 
anyone else, except for the researchers, ever to find out what choices you make, and hence what you 
earn in the session. This session consists of three activities.  
First, you will be asked to perform several individual activities. Second, you will be asked to make 
decisions in a group where other group members are anonymous. Finally, you will be asked to work 
together with other participants to solve problems.  
The activities are completely independent, which means that your performance in one activity has no 
impact on what happens in the other activities. The estimated time of the whole session is 
approximately three hours. 
In each activity, you can earn money. You will not be informed about how much money you have 
earned until the end of the session. The payment to you is organized as follows. The researchers keep 
track of how much money you earn throughout the session. At the end of the session, they prepare an 
envelope containing the money you have earned, where they will ensure that it is impossible to 
identify the amount of money inside the envelope simply by looking at it. This envelope will be 
handed over to you in private when you leave the session. 
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 It is very important that you remember your desk number and report it in each activity, as the desk 
number is your identity in this experiment. 
[Individual Game: Knowledge test] 
We will now explain the first activity in this session. We will shortly ask you some general questions. 
The questions are grouped in two topics: health and nutrition and business knowledge.   
In total there are 10 questions, and for each question you can choose between four different answers. 
Your job is to tick off the correct answer. You should only tick off one alternative. If you tick off more 
than one alternative, your answer will be considered incorrect. We now provide an example of how 
you should do this.  
[MODERATOR reads Overhead KT] 
Your job is to tick off one of these answers. The correct answer is XXXX. Hence, if you tick off any 
of the other numbers, your answer is incorrect. In particular, you should never tick off more than one 
alternative. 
For each correct answer, you are paid the fixed rate of 150 Tsh. 
We will now hand out the questions but please do not turn over the page before you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until the first sheet has been handed out to all participants. He continues 
when HE gives signal] 
You can now turn over the sheet. First, now and for all sheets that you receive, make sure that you fill 
in your correct desk number, so that we can pay you correctly. We will now read question by question, 
and then for each question you tick off what you think is the correct answer.  
Is this clear to everyone? If not, then please raise your hand and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR proceeds when HE gives signal] 
I'll now start reading the first question. 
[MODERATOR reads the questions on the sheet] 
[LHE gives a signal 15 seconds after Moderator has finished reading each question and the 
alternative answers; this applies for both topics] 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets. 
[Individual Risk Game] 
We now move to the second part of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. Let’s explain in more detail. 
First, we will simply give each of you 1000 Tsh. This is your money. You may decide to add it to the 
total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the session, or you may decide to take a risk. If 
you take risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you are lucky, you will get 2500 Tsh instead of 
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1000 Tsh. If you are unlucky, you lose the 2500 Tsh and nothing is added to your final payment from 
this situation. 
Here is how we decide whether you have been lucky or unlucky. When everyone has made their 
choice of whether to take the risk or not, we prepare two pieces of paper; one piece with the word 
LUCKY, the other piece with the word UNLUCKY. 
[F illustrates the procedure, as Moderator reads] 
We will then put them into two identical and empty envelopes, and the envelopes will be placed in this 
bowl. Thus it will be impossible for any of us to identify which envelope contains the word LUCKY. 
We will randomly select one of you to make the draw of one of the envelopes at the end of the 
workshop. If this envelope contains the word LUCKY, we will pay 2500 Tsh to those of you who 
chose to take risk. However, if this envelope contains the word UNLUCKY, those who chose to take 
the risk will not receive anything in this situation. Thus, it is equally likely that those who take the risk 
are LUCKY or UNLUCKY. 
For those of you who chose the certain payment, the outcome of this draw does not affect your pay. In 
any case, you receive the certain payment of 500 Tsh. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead 5 and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 Tsh 
or keep it. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 Tsh or keep it. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We remind you that the determination of LUCKY and UNLUCKY outcome will be done at the end of 
the experiment.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now we move on to a new situation. Again, we will give you some money, this time 1500 Tsh. This is 
your money. You may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the 
session, or you may decide to take a risk. If you take the risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you 
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are lucky, you will get 2500 Tsh instead of 1500 Tsh. If you are unlucky, you lose the 1500 Tsh and 
nothing is added to your final payment from this situation 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead 7 and reads it. He then continues] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 Tsh 
or keep it. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 Tsh or keep it. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now all of you have made choice, at the end of the workshop, we will determine the outcome with the 
same procedure as has been explained.  
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
 
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
When all of you have made your choices, at the end of the workshop, we will determine the outcome 
with the same procedure as has been explained.  
You have now completed this particular part of this session.  
We now proceed to another activity.  
 [Individual Game: Dictator Game] 
We now move to the next activity of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. Let’s explain in more detail. 
We will start a pair-activity. Each of you will be assigned to another person. This person is also a 
PRIDE client. You and this person will receive 1000 TZS in total. 	  
You will not be told who you will be paired with, and your partner will not know your identity. You 
will only know one characteristic of your partner. This characteristic will be given to you privately 
in the sheet that we will hand out to you. 	  
You will decide how to share the money between you and your partner, and you can send from 0 up to 
1000 TZS to your partner with 100 as increment. 	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[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead DG and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out a sheet where you have to make decisions how much to share for your partner. 
In the sheet, you can see one characteristic of your partner. Please do not turn over the sheet until 
you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the decision.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheets. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now do this one more time. You will be paired with another PRIDE client. You and this 
person will receive 1000 TZS in total.	  
As in the previous activity, you will not be told who you will be paired with, and your partner will not 
know your identity. You will only know one characteristic of your partner. This characteristic will be 
given to you privately in the sheet that we will hand out to you. 	  
You will decide how to share the money between you and your partner, and you can send from 0 up to 
1000 TZS to your partner with 100 as increment. 	  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out a sheet where you have to make decisions how much to share for your partner. 
In the sheet, you can see one characteristic of your partner. Please do not turn over the sheet until you 
are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the decision.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal]  
We will now collect the sheets. 
 [Group Game: Public Good Game] 
We now move to the next activity of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. In this particular activity, you will play in a group. This means, both your decision and others’ 
decisions will matter for the sum of money that you earn in this activity.  
62
Your group member will be randomly selected, and there are 4 persons in each group. We create the 
group by taking the number from two different boxes randomly. You will not know who your group 
members are, only the researcher will know who is grouped with whom. 
 
To be read ONLY in SAME GENDER TREATMENT  
Let’s create the groups before we proceed with the information about the activity.  Here, there are two 
boxes, one consists of desk numbers of male participants, and the other consists of desk numbers of 
female participants. Now, we will make groups of 4 persons that consist of people with the same 
gender. Now, my assistant will take 4 desk numbers from the male box, this is the first group. Then, 
we proceed to take 4 desk numbers from the female box, this is second group. We will proceed to 
create the next group. 
In case the remaining desk numbers in the box are not enough to create a group, the participants with 
these desk numbers will do a different task.  
 
To be read ONLY in MIXED GENDER TREATMENT  
Let’s create the groups before we proceed with the information about the activity.  Here, there are two 
boxes, one consists of desk numbers of male participants, and the other consists of desk numbers of 
female participants. Now, we will make groups of 4 persons that consist of two female and two male 
participants. Now, my assistant will take 2 desk numbers from the male box and 2 desk numbers from 
the female box, this is the first group of 4 persons. We will proceed to create the next group. 
In case the remaining desk numbers in the box are not enough to create a group, the participants with 
these desk numbers will do a different task.  
 
Now, we will proceed with the information about how you can earn money in this session.  
You are now in a group of 4 persons with 3 other members in this room.  Each group member receives 
2000 TZS and will decide how to allocate this 2000 TZS. You can either put this 2000 TZS   into your 
private fund or you can invest it fully or partially into group fund. Each TZS you do not invest into 
the group fund will automatically remain in your private fund and will be added into your payment.  
The total group fund from 4 people’s contribution will be doubled and shared equally to all 
participants.   
 
To make you easily understand this particular activity, I will ask my assistant to visualize this 
activity.  
 
 
First example: 
Now, I give each person 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether they want to keep it 
for private, or to contribute to group fund.  
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Now, you see that all of them do not contribute. This means each of them keeps 2000 for their private 
fund. Then, the group fund remains at zero. This means they will not get money from the group fund. 
So, everyone will get 2000 from this activity and can take home this 2000 TZS.   
Because this was an example, I am taking the money back from them. 
 
Let’s try second example: 
As before, I give each of the group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that all of them contribute 2000 TZS. Then the total group fund will be 8000. Then we 
will add 8000 more to the group fund, so, the group fund becomes 16000. We share the money equally 
between all participants. Then, you see that each participant receives 4000 from the group fund.  
As you see they contributed all their money to the group fund, hence their private fund is zero, 
because, now, they receive 4000 from group fund, the total of private fund and their share from the 
group fund that they can take home is 4000 TZS.   
Because this was an example, I am taking the money back from them. 
Let’s try a third example: 
As before, I give each of the group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that member 1 contributes 0, member 2 contributes 500, member 3 contributes 1500 and 
member 4 contributes 2000. 
This means, member 1 has 2000 in his private fund, member 2 has 1500 TZS in his private fund, 
member 3 has 500 in his private fund, and member 4 has nothing left in his private fund.  
Now let’s calculate how much money is in the group fund. You see that this is 4000. Then, we will 
double it with the meaning that we add 4000 more to the group fund, so now, it becomes 8000. Then 
we divided it equally between the 4 participants. 
NOW YOU WILL RECEIVE A SHEET WHERE YOU SHOULD WRITE HOW MUCH 
EVERYONE WILL RECEIVE FROM THE GROUP FUND.  
PLEASE WRITE DOWN NOW, and my assistant will check whether you have finished the answer.  
As everyone has answered, let us calculate how much everyone gets. Now, you see that everyone has 
received the same amount of money. Please write it down, how much everyone gets in your sheet.  
My assistant now will collect the answer.  
So, now, you see that everyone receives 2000 from the group fund.  
Now, let’s us calculate how much money each member has.  
Member one has 2000 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 4000 
that he/she can take home.  
64
Member two has 1500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 3500 
that he/she can take home.  
Member 3 has 500 in private the fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2500 that 
he/she can take home.  
Member 4 has 0 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2000 that 
he/she can take home.  
Now, let us redo the same example so that it becomes clearer for you.  
Now I am taking the money back from them. 
Now we redo the example 
As before, I give each of the group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that member 1 contributes 0, member 2 contributes 500, member 3 contributes 1500 and 
member 4 contributes 2000. 
This means, member 1 has 2000 in his private fund, member 2 has 1500 TZS in his private fund, 
member 3 has 500 in his private fund, and member 4 has nothing left in his private fund.  
Now let’s calculate how much money is in the group fund. You see that this is 4000. Then, we will 
double it with the meaning that we add 4000 more to the group fund, so now, it becomes 8000. Then 
we divided it equally between the 4 participants.  
So, now, you see that everyone receives 2000 from the group fund.  
Now, let’s us calculate how much money each member has.  
Member one has 2000 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 4000 
that he/she can take home.  
Member two has 1500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 3500 
that he/she can take home.  
Member 3 has 500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2500 that 
he/she can take home.  
Member 4 has 0 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2000 that 
he/she can bring home.  
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Control Questions] 
Now, let’s try more examples, but now, you should calculate by yourself and write down the answers.  
Now, we will hand out a sheet with examples.  
65
CHECK CONTROL SHEET QUESTIONS 
THESE ARE  CONTROL QUESTIONS INCLUDING THE P-EXPERIMENT 
 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, my assistant will collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, we finish with examples and we hope you have fully understood the activity. We proceed with 
the main activity where you should make a decision which will determine how much money you will 
take home as this is a group activity, remember that the decisions of the other members in your group 
will also determine how much money you take home.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Group Game: Public Good Game C-experiment] 
Remember now you have been grouped with 3 different participants in this room; 
[for SAME GENDER TREATMENT]  who have the same gender as you  
[for MIXED GENDER TREATMENT]  one of them has the same gender as you, and the two others 
are people with opposite gender.  
The group for participants with these particular numbers:__________ is not full. So, these persons 
should do another task. My assistant will come to you and explain the special task. 
Now, we give each of you 2000 TZS. Then you must decide how much you want to contribute to the 
group fund and how much you want to keep for your private fund.  As you remember from our 
previous examples, the money that you keep in the private fund will be added directly to the amount 
that you take home, and money that you put in the group fund will be doubled and shared equally 
between all 4 members in the group.   
[MODERATOR shows Overhead CE and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make a decision about how much you will put into 
the group fund. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, considering the examples that have been shown before, how much do you want to contribute to 
the group fund and how much do you think the other participants will contribute? Please write it down.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet.  
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Thank you for your cooperation up to this point.  
We now proceed to another activity.  
[GROUP GAME] 
Now, we will form you into a group of four entrepreneurs. You will be allowed to talk with your 
group member in this session. Remember you are only allowed to talk with your group members, and 
not other participants. Further, please remember to talk in a tone such that only your group members 
can hear you. If anyone breaks this rule, we must kindly ask you to leave the classroom.  
In this activity, you can earn money in a group. But then you will share the money equally among the 
members.  
Now, let’s determine the group.  
Similar to before, we will randomly assign you into groups. But, now we will announce who is 
grouped with whom, and we will kindly ask you to take note of your group number. After everyone 
gets a group, we want you to sit together in your group. My assistant will let you know where each 
group should sit.  
[GROUP COOPERATION 1: KNOWLEDGE TEST] 
Now, you will do activity in a group. The first activity will be answering questions. In this 
activity, your group will solve questions that are similar to previous individual questions. You can 
discuss among you what the right answers are.  
There are 10 questions that a group should answer. For each right answer, the group will receive 600 
TZS. Total amount received by the group will be distributed equally to each member. If your group 
answers the all questions right, your group will receive a bonus of 5000 TZS. The time limit to answer 
the questions is 8 minutes.  
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead KT and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet of questions that should be solved in your group. Please do not turn 
over the sheet until you are told to do so. You will have 8 minutes to work on these questions, if you 
are still working when we say time is over, your group will be disqualified. After 7 minutes, you will 
be notified that there is 1 minute left.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, you can start working.  
[F gives a signal that 7 minutes have passed; Moderator announces the reminder] 
[F gives a signal that 8 minutes have passed; Moderator announces that participants should put 
down their pens, and if they are still working then their group will be disqualified.] 
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Now you should stop working and put your pen on the table.  
My assistant will collect the sheets.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Cooperation Game: Group Risk Game] 
We now move to the next group activity of the workshop, where the group also can earn money, but in 
a different way. The money that the group earns will be shared equally among the members.  
You will be allowed to talk with your group members in this session. Remember you are only allowed 
to talk with your group members, and not other participants. Furthermore, please remember to talk in a 
tone that only your group members can hear your voice. If anyone breaks this rule, we must kindly ask 
you to leave the classroom.  
[RISK GAME 1] 
In this activity, you as a group of four people will receive 4000 TZS.  
This is your money. Your group may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at 
the end of the session, or your group may decide to take a risk. 
If your group chooses not to take risk, the amount of 4000 Tsh will be divided equally among 
members of the group, meaning that each member will receive 1000 Tsh.  
If your group takes the risk, then your group can be lucky or unlucky. If your group is lucky, your 
group will get 10000 Tsh instead of 4000 Tsh. This money will then be shared equally between 
members, so that each member will receive 2500 TZs. If your group is unlucky, your group loses the 
4000 Tsh and nothing is added to each member’s final payment from this situation. 
As this is a group activity, you must make a decision in the group. One group is only allowed to make 
one decision.  
 [RISK GAME 2] 
Now, we will redo the same game. Now we move on to a new situation. Again, you as a group of four 
people will receive some money. This time it is 6000 TZS. 
This is your money. Your group may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at 
the end of the session, or your group may decide to take a risk. 
If your group chooses not to take risk, the amount of 6000 Tsh will be divided equally among 
members of the group, meaning that each member will receive 1500 Tsh.  
If your group takes the risk, then your group can be lucky or unlucky. If your group is lucky, your 
group will get 10000 Tsh instead of 6000 Tsh. This money then will be shared equally between 
members, so that each will receive 2500 TZs. If your group is unlucky, your group loses the 6000 Tsh 
and nothing is added to each member’s final payment from this situation. 
As this is a group activity, you must make a decision in the group. One group is only allowed to make 
one decision.  
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We will then determine whether you will be lucky or unlucky using the same procedure as before. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the decision of investing or not. Please do not 
turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. You have 4 minutes to make the group decision.   
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, please mark whether your group wants to invest or keep the money. 
We will now collect the sheets. Please remember to write your group number and each member’s desk 
number in the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[DETERMINING THE RESULT] 
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, we will determine the result of your investments.  
Now, we will take the result for the investment choice one, when you decided to put 1000 in a risky 
project or not. If it turns out lucky, the one who chooses to invest will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Now, we will take the result for the investment choice two, when you decided to put 1500 in a risky 
project or not. If it turns out lucky, the one who chooses to invest will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Now, we will take the result for the group investment choice 1, when your group decided to put 4000 
in the risky project or not. If it turns out lucky, the group who choose to invest will receive 10000, 
meaning that each member will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Now, we will take the result for the group investment choice 2, when your group decided to put 6000 
in a risky project or not. If it turns out lucky, the group who choose to invest will receive 10000, 
meaning that each member will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Your payment from investment choice will be determined according to this result.  
Our assistant will now prepare the payment.  
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[SOCIAL NETWORK SURVEY] 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
In the meantime, we will call each of your desk numbers and please stand up when your number is  
called. Further, we will ask the others to raise their hands if they have known this person outside the 
workshop. 
While we are waiting for the assistants to prepare the payments which you have earned, we would like 
to offer you [for morning session:] LUNCH; [for afternoon session:] REFRESHMENT. After the 
LUNCH/REFRESHMENT we will call your desk numbers one by one and give you an envelope with 
your payment and the signed sheet for your participation compensation.  
[MODERATOR shows Overhead THANK YOU] 
We would like to thank you all for participating in this session. Your input will be most valuable for 
our research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. May we ask you not to discuss this session 
with others before the end of this week, since we will arrange further sessions with other microcredit 
clients the coming days. Please leave the pen on your desk when you leave the room. Again, thank you 
for your participation in this workshop.	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Abstract
This study measures the impact of a mobile phone text reminder on
the repayment behavior of pawnshop borrowers in Indonesia. We randomly
assigned borrowers into a treatment group, who received a reminder, and
a control group, who received no reminder. The results show that the text
reminder increased the proportion of borrowers that went to the pawnshop
before the loan due date by 6.9 percentage points. Moreover, we find that
female borrowers are more responsive to the reminder than male borrowers.
We also investigated different content for the text reminder, but found no
difference in impact.
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1 Introduction
People do not always act in accordance with their best interests. For instance,
we may have an ambition to stop smoking, start exercising, save more, or do
our homework on time, but we often fail to live up to these commitments. The
literature points to the potential of small and unobtrusive interventions, called
“nudges”, that can assist people to stick to their commitments. For example,
Gine´ et al. (2010) study how opening a deposit account conditional on urine
test results may help people give up smoking, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
analyze different ways of setting student assignment deadlines that can help
to reduce the negative effect of procrastination, while Benartzi and Thaler
(2004) introduce an innovative employee retirement savings program that
automatically increases the contribution to the pension plan every time there
is an increase in salary.
Elsewhere, Karlan et al. (2010) argue that suboptimal behavior can
arise from limited attention, and that reminders may better align behavior
with intentions. In their model, Karlan et al. (2010) predict that people
will undersave if they have limited attention, and that reminders can
increase saving. Moreover, reminders about the goals of saving will have an
even stronger effect. Using field experiments, Karlan et al. (2010) obtain
supporting evidence for these theories. In a loan repayment setting, Cadena
and Schoar (2011) contrast the use of pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives
to improve repayment behavior in Uganda. They find that mobile phone
text reminders produce a similar effect to a reduction in interest rates or an
equivalent pecuniary reward in improving repayment behavior. In contrast,
Karlan et al. (2012) find no overall treatment effect of a text reminder among
borrowers in the Philippines, but do conclude that the inclusion of the name
of the account officer in the text exerts a positive impact on repayment
behavior.
The purpose of the present study is to provide additional empirical
evidence on the issue of reminders and loan repayment by implementing
an experiment in a different sort of loan institution and a different country.
Using a field experiment conducted in a branch of a state-owned pawnshop
in Indonesia, we consider whether a reminder can nudge borrowers to repay
their loans on time. We randomly assigned borrowers into treatment and
control groups, where borrowers in the treatment group received a text
message to remind them about the due date of the loan, while those in the
control group received no such message. Our results show that a reminder
with information about the due date assists borrowers in repaying their loans
before the due date. Moreover, our analysis reveals an interesting gender
asymmetry, with women being much more responsive to the reminders than
men.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
the context and the pawning procedure. Section 3 provides a simple model
to formalize the problem at hand. Section 4 describes the data collection
and the experimental design. Section 5 details the results of the experiment,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Context
2.1 Development of Pawnshops in Indonesia
Pawnshops have existed in Indonesia since the nineteenth century, when
they were privately owned by traders. The practice became widespread in a
relatively short time, indicating a high demand for this service. However,
the private pawnshops soon gained a negative reputation because of high
interest rates and low assessment values. In 1901, a state-owned pawnshop
was established to protect borrowers from irresponsible lending practices.1
Since then, the Indonesian state-owned pawnshop, Pegadaian, has provided
credit to millions of borrowers. The pawnshop’s stated mission is “to better
serve the country”. This social mission is reflected in such policies as
lower interest rates for the lowest category of loans, the existence of a
grace period, public announcement of the auction date, and the practice of
sending the borrower a letter advising that the item is about to be auctioned.
These policies, combined with the speedy procurement of credit, have made
Pegadaian popular among borrowers.
By 2011, Pegadaian had served some 25.5 million borrowers and had more
than 4,500 branches across Indonesia (Pegadaian, 2011). In fact, the number
of Pegadaian branches is comparable to that of Bank Rakyat Indonesia
(BRI), which is widely recognized as one of the world’s largest microfinance
institutions. Pawnshop transactions peak during religious celebrations or
the start of the school year, which indicates that, to a large extent, people
use pawnshop loans for consumption purposes.
1For more information about the history of pawnshops in Indonesia, see Nagazumi
(1974).
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2.2 The Pawning Procedure
The pawning procedure starts with a potential borrower taking an item
intended to be pawned, such as jewelry or electronic goods, to the pawnshop.
The borrower then fills in a borrowing form, hands in the form together with
the item for pawning, and waits for the officer to assess the item. The officer
states the maximum amount of credit that the pawnshop can offer and the
borrower states the amount of money that he or she wishes to borrow. The
assessment value is usually less than the market value of the good. After the
two parties have agreed on the loan size, the transaction takes place. The
pawnshop retains the item as collateral.
Following the agreement, a cashier delivers the amount of credit agreed
to by both parties, and then both sign a letter of credit. The cashier then
explains the terms of the loan, particularly to new borrowers. The loan is
due on the 120th day. For a typical loan, the interest rate is 1.2% per 15
days without compounding. The longer a client delays the loan repayment,
the higher his or her interest payment. If borrowers keep loans for more than
105 days, the interest payment increases to 9.6% of the loan.
For borrowers who are unable to repay their loan in full, other payment
options are available. First, they may extend the loan, in which case they
pay only the interest and then have another 120 days to repay the loan
principal. Second, they may pay an installment, that is, they pay the interest
and some of the loan principal. This option gives the borrower another 120
days to repay the remainder of the loan. Conditional on whether or not the
assessment value is higher than the loan size, borrowers may also request an
increase in the size of the loan. Borrowers can select these options at any
point in time during the loan period. If a loan reaches its maturity date and
the borrower has taken no action on the loan, the collateral will be auctioned.
Until the auction date, there is a grace period, during which the interest
payment is kept constant. Hence, borrowers who take advantage of the grace
period are charged a lower effective interest rate.
The terms and conditions of the loan are stated in the letter of credit,
including the interest rate, administration fee, the due date, and the date
for auction, which is stated to take place three days after the due date. In
reality, for practical purposes, auctions are held only twice a month. However,
borrowers might not be fully informed about the auction dates, particularly
those who have no prior experience with the pawnshop.
The status quo practice in the pawnshop is to send borrowers a letter
informing them of the auction date and urging them to repay the loan
before the auction date. If borrowers do not respond, a pawnshop officer will
telephone them, inform them about the auction, and check their intentions
to ensure that the pawnshop does not auction items that could be redeemed.
76
3 Model and Predictions
In our pawnshop setting, there are two deadlines for loan repayment: the due
date and the auction date. Before the due date, there is a monetary incentive
to repay sooner because the interest payment increases with the number
of loan days. However, when the due date is approaching, the monetary
incentive to repay sooner disappears because of the grace period between the
due date and the auction date. Neoclassical economic theory would suggest
that borrowers holding the loan for more than 105 days, at which point they
reach the maximum interest payment, should repay precisely on the auction
date. However, the data show otherwise: more than half of borrowers repay
the loan in the period before the due date. Furthermore, the peak repayment
period occurs on the due date, showing that the borrowers place a value on
this deadline.2
One reason for repaying by the due date is the presence of a moral
incentive. Such moral and ethical considerations are influenced by a concern
both for others and for one’s own image (Levitt and List, 2007). Borrowers
who value the due date may feel guilt or regret if they are unable to repay
before this date. These feelings could be exacerbated by discomfort and
shame because the borrowers are aware that their actions will generate costs
for the lender.
The following model shows the scenario where borrowers are influenced
by moral considerations and how a text reminder can help people achieve
their own best interest. In the model, we make an implicit assumption that
people are always willing to redeem their pawned item.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are two options for payment:
either on the due date or after the due date if the due date is forgotten.
Utility is then defined as U , if the payment is on time, with utility reduced
by M if the payment is late. M ≥ 0 represents the moral cost of being late.
Factors that determine the presence and magnitude of the moral cost include
“the financial externality that an action imposes on others” and “the set of
social norms and legal rules that govern behavior in a particular society”
(Levitt and List, 2007).
Define p ∈ (0, 1) as the probability of forgetting the due date. Hence, we
can define the expected utility of borrowing as:
EU = (1− p) U + p (U −M). (1)
People will borrow if EU > 0, which is equivalent to:
U > pM. (2)
2See Figure A1 in the Appendix.
77
For borrowers who are not influenced by moral considerations, the value
of M is zero, which means that their utility is not determined by the timing
of repayment; for those borrowers concerned about morality, M > 0, the
repayment date is important.
Equation 2 shows that people borrow when the utility gain from borrowing
is higher than the probability of forgetting the date multiplied by the moral
cost. Where U > M , people borrow. Conversely, where U ≤M , there is a
critical level p∗ = U/M when EU = 0, at which individuals are indifferent
between borrowing and not borrowing. If a person has p > p∗ then EU < 0,
whereas if p < p∗ then EU > 0. This implies that only individuals who have
p < p∗ will take out a loan. For borrowers who have M > U , remembering
the due date is especially important because if they forget, they are actually
worse off than if they had not taken out the loan in the first place.
The presence of a reminder reduces the probability of forgetting the
due date, such that pr, the probability of forgetting the due date with a
reminder, is lower than p, the probability of forgetting the due date without
a reminder. For simplicity, let us assume that pr = 0. This implies that the
reminder guarantees that borrowers gain from the loan. The model generates
a testable hypothesis: the reminder may induce early repayment, but only
among those borrowers concerned about morality.
Furthermore, awareness of the reminder system may encourage potential
borrowers, who previously had M > U and p > p∗ such that they were not
willing to borrow, to apply for a loan, because now they may have pr ≤ p∗.
In this way, the reminder will provide the lender with a better mix of clients
by increasing the share of moral borrowers in the client base.
Late repayment, of course, creates costs for the lender. These costs include
the foregone earnings from the lower effective interest rate as borrowers take
advantage of the grace period and both the monetary and nonmonetary costs
and hassle of contacting borrowers to inform them about the auction date.
Hence, the pawnshop will clearly benefit if a reminder turns out to be an
effective way of increasing the timeliness of repayment. Ultimately, therefore,
both parties can benefit from the intervention.
Improvements in Short Message Service (SMS) technology have made it
easier to send bulk personalized text reminders in a short period of time,
with the message reaching borrowers instantly. Furthermore, sending an
SMS is cheaper than other means of communication such as conventional
letters or telephone calls. Hence, in this study, we use SMS as the means of
sending the reminder.3 However, one limitation of SMS as a communication
tool is that borrowers can change their mobile telephone number more easily
than they change their postal address and may not inform the pawnshop
about the change. Because of this limitation, we estimate the treatment
3Throughout the paper, “SMS”, “text reminder”, “text”, “text message”, and
“reminder” are used interchangeably when referring to the chosen intervention.
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effect using the intention to treat (ITT) estimator.
4 Data Collection
4.1 Administrative Data
This study takes place in one of the Pegadaian branches in Jakarta, Indonesia.
The branch has been in operation since 2000 and it is located in an area with
both businesses and residential housing. Consequently, the branch serves
borrowers who use loans for both productive and nonproductive purposes.
In a normal day, the branch accepts more than a hundred items of jewelry,
electronics, and motorcycles as pledges. Jewelry accounts for 95% of the
pawned items.
From the branch’s administrative database, we collected the following
information on loans registered in January 2012: the date when the loan was
set, the loan identity number, and whether the loan was newly registered
or extended from a prior loan. The focus of this study is on medium-sized
loans. We include only medium-sized loans for several reasons: (1) loans
in the lowest and the highest loan categories account for only 3.5% of the
total loans made; (2) only a small proportion of borrowers in the lowest loan
category have a mobile phone; and (3) as there is no upper limit of loan size,
some of the loans in the highest loan category can be very large and are
categorized as outliers. Overall, 2,294 medium-sized loans were registered in
January 2012.
4.2 Experimental Design
We first organized the loans by borrowing date. On the 100th day of each
loan, we checked whether the loan had been repaid. We then sorted the
unpaid loans based on the name of the borrower and the loan identity
number.4 Randomization was done at the borrower level, rather than at the
loan level, because a borrower may have more than one loan with the same
due date. However, we assigned all loans to the treatment or control group
based on the treatment assignment of the borrowers. Two out of every three
borrowers received a text reminder containing information about the due
date of their loan; the other third of the borrowers served as the control
group and received no reminder. The number of loans in the experiment
4Although our original plan was to send out the text reminder on exactly the 100th
day for all loans, administrative issues meant that this was not possible. Instead, reminders
were scheduled to be sent twice a week, so borrowers may have been sent a reminder on
the 99th, 100th or 101st day of their loan; on one occasion, the reminder was sent on the
102nd day. For simplicity, we use the term “100th day” when we refer to the day that we
sent the text reminder.
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ranged from 31 to 95 per day, depending on the number of loans that had
been made on any particular day and how many of them had been repaid.
In total, 1,456 loans by 1,020 borrowers were included in the experiment.
In some cases, a borrower had multiple loans made on different dates. As
the randomization was done for each day, there was the chance that such
borrowers might have been randomized into both the treatment and control
groups. Therefore, borrowers assigned to both control and treatment groups
were excluded from further analysis.5 Finally, 1,196 loans were eligible for
further analysis, with a total of 926 borrowers, of whom 752 had one loan
and 174 had multiple loans taken out on the same day. As a text message
was sent for each loan, borrowers with multiple loans in the treatment group
received more than one reminder, which means the treatment intensity was
stronger for this group. We do not exclude this kind of borrower, but cluster
standard errors at the borrower level and control for whether the loan is one
of multiple loans 6 The baseline characteristics of the loans in the treatment
and control groups are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and the Treatment Balance
Control Treatment Diff. Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.314 0.350 0.037 0.338
(0.465) (0.477) (0.029) (0.473)
Loan Size 3.662 3.572 -0.089 3.603
(3.337) (3.430) (0.207) (3.398)
New Loan 0.227 0.231 0.004 0.229
(0.420) (0.422) (0.026) (0.421)
Multiple Loans 0.338 0.388 0.050∗ 0.371
(0.024) (0.017) (0.030) (0.014)
Observations 405 791 1196
Note: Loan size is in millions of Indonesian rupiah (IDR). Male, New Loan and Multiple
Loans are dummy variables.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5Based on this criterion, we excluded 260 loans for 94 borrowers.
6The characteristics of the borrowers with multiple loans differ significantly from
those with single loans. In the single-loan group, the percentage of men is higher, the
proportion of new loans is larger, and loans are smaller than in the multiple-loans group.
However, within each treatment group, there is no difference in the baseline characteristics
of borrowers with multiple and single loans.
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Of the 1,196 loans eligible for subsequent analysis, the average loan size is
3.60 million IDR. Almost a quarter of these are new loans made in January
2012, while the other three-quarters are old loans for items pawned prior
to January 2012. Around one-third of the eligible loans are obtained by
men. There is no difference between the treatment and control groups in the
mean of these three characteristics. Furthermore, as mentioned above, some
borrowers have multiple loans. In the control group, 33.8% of loans share
a borrower with another loan; the corresponding number in the treatment
group is 38.8%. The difference is significant at the 10% level.
4.3 Survey Data
During the period between when the SMS reminders were sent and the
auction date, we conducted a survey to obtain the characteristics of the
borrowers that were part of the experiment when they came to the pawnshop
to repay or extend their loan. Using this survey, we collected information
such as the borrower’s age, education and income level, employment and
marital status, the purpose of the loan, and experience with the pawnshop.7
We contacted 423 (41.47%) of the 1,020 borrowers that were initially part
of the experiment.8 Some borrowers refused to be interviewed even though
they came to the pawnshop (225 borrowers), some did not show up to
make the repayment before the auction date (187 borrowers) and in some
cases the person could not be identified.9 In addition to this target group,
we also interviewed a random sample of borrowers to check whether the
characteristics of the borrowers that were part of the experiment, i.e., those
who had not repaid the loan by the 100th day, differed from the total
population of pawnshop borrowers. We did this because there could have
been important characteristics that drove selection into the group included
in the study. We managed to randomly interview 220 borrowers that were
not part of the experiment.
7The SMS reminder was not mentioned in the survey.
8The initial intention of the survey was to estimate the effect of background
characteristics that could interact with the treatment status. However, because of the low
response rate, we were unable to use the data for further analysis.
9There was no difference in terms of age and gender between borrowers that refused
to be interviewed and those that were interviewed.
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Table 2: Characteristics of Borrowers
Experiment Sample Random Sample
Mean Mean Diff.
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Age 41.712 37.578 4.133∗∗∗
(11.635) (11.124)
Male 0.374 0.366 0.009
(0.485) (0.483)
Highest Education 0.505 0.477 0.028
(0.501) (0.501)
Highest Income 0.375 0.403 -0.028
(0.485) (0.492)
Experience 46.903 38.042 8.861∗∗∗
(36.555) (41.290)
Observations 423 220
Notes: Loan size is in millions IDR. Experience is in months.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We then compared the characteristics of the truncated sample with those
of the random sample as shown in Table 2, and found that the target group
was slightly older and had more experience with the pawnshop compared
with the random sample. The profile of borrowers that were part of the
experiment is as follows: the average age is 41.7 years and 37.4% are male.
The age range of borrowers is 20–76 years.
Compared with the population of Jakarta in the same age range, the
pawnshop borrowers appear to be from the upper part of the distribution for
educational background and income, as 50.5% attained an education level
above senior high school and 37.5% of the borrowers have a monthly income
of more than 5 million IDR.10 The corresponding numbers in the population
are 30% and 9.76%, respectively.11 This is not surprising considering that
borrowers must own valuable items to serve as collateral when borrowing.
The average size of the loan among survey respondents is 3.07 million
IDR.12 This is equivalent to about twice the regional minimum monthly
wage in Jakarta.13 Slightly more than a quarter of respondents said that
they used the loan to pay school fees, while almost a quarter said that the
money was for business purposes. The borrowers have typically been clients
of the pawnshop for a long time, with an average pawnshop experience of
slightly less than four years.
101 USD (US Dollar) ≈ 9,500 IDR (Indonesian Rupiah), June 2012.
11Data on the population of Jakarta are calculated using data for the first quarter
of 2011 taken from the National Socioeconomic Survey conducted by BPS (Statistics
Indonesia).
12The loan size data are taken from the pawnshop’s administrative database.
13The regional minimum wage in Jakarta in 2012 was 1.53 million IDR.
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5 Results
5.1 Qualitative Assessment of the Treatment
Immediately after sending out the reminder, we received more than 50 replies
from borrowers. Most of the replies indicated that the borrowers were grateful
for the reminder. Several borrowers referred to the date and their planned
action in their reply and many asked questions about how much they needed
to pay. These responses show that some borrowers were not fully aware of
the conditions on their loans, whereas others were unable to calculate how
much interest they owed.
In one of the replies, a woman indicated that she had completely forgotten
about the loan. She answered the SMS with “I never had anything to do
with the pawnshop, or, maybe I had forgotten that? My name is Mrs. [...]”.
We replied with “You have borrowed [...] and pawned [...].” She replied with
“Oh yes, that one. I had completely forgotten that. Thank you.”14
We used the telephone number to link such responses to the data on
borrowers in order to identify which borrowers sent a reply. We found that
30% of the replies were sent by men and 70% by women, which is similar to
the gender composition of the borrowers that received an SMS.
5.2 Overall Effect of the Reminder
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the loan
period after the treatment. To discern the treatment impact, the CDFs for
the treatment and control groups were calculated and plotted separately.
The CDF shows that the loan period differs according to treatment status,
with the CDF for the treatment group being higher than that for the control
group for almost all days of the loan period. The two distributions are
significantly different (p=0.037, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). To test the
mean treatment effect, the ITT estimator is estimated based on the following
equation:
Yi = α+ βSMSi + γXi + i, (3)
where Y shows the outcome variable of interest, SMS is an indicator
showing whether or not the due date of the loan is communicated to the
borrower using SMS, and X is a vector of loan characteristics.
14This is the only reply that we followed up on. Other messages did not receive a
reply because the text reminder was supposed to be automated.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution Function of Loan Period by Treatment
There are three outcomes of interest. The first two concern the dummy
variables indicating whether clients repay their loan before the due date
and before the auction date. The other outcome of interest is whether the
SMS leads to a reduction in the average number of loan days. For this
outcome variable, the observations included in the regression are conditional
on whether the loan period is observed.15
Table 3: Timing of the Action, by Group (%)
Date of the Action Control Treatment Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Due Date 38.77 45.64 43.32
Between Due Date & Auction Date 52.59 43.11 46.32
Unknown 8.64 11.25 10.37
Loan Period 122.16 120.62 121.15
Observations 405 791 1196
Note: Before Due Date, Between Due Date & Auction Date, and Unknown are
dummy variables indicating when the action is taken. If no action is taken by the
auction date, the loan is recorded as unknown. The loan period is the number of
days between when the loan is taken out and when it is repaid.
15The cutoff date for repayment monitoring was the auction date. Some loans had
not been repaid by the auction date, so the exact loan period is not observed.
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The mean values for the outcomes of interest by treatment group are
shown in Table 3. Consistent with the result from the CDF plot, the
proportion of borrowers who repay before the due date is higher in the
treatment group than in the control group: 45.64% compared to 38.77%.
The table also indicates that the reminder has an effect in reducing the mean
loan period from 122.16 days to 120.62 days.
As the borrowers were assigned randomly into the treatment and control
groups, β indicates the causal impact of a reminder, and γ is a vector of
parameters showing the correlation effect of the independent variables with
the repayment behavior. The independent variables are loan size, an indicator
of whether a loan is a new loan, and the gender of the borrower.
Table 4 shows the regression results for Equation 3. The odd-numbered
columns detail the estimations without control variables and the
even-numbered columns show the estimations with control variables.
Table 4: Regression Results: Effect of SMS
Before Before Loan Period
Due Date Auction Date (Days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SMS 0.069∗ 0.079∗∗ -0.026 -0.025 -1.540∗∗ -1.601∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.023) (0.022) (0.658) (0.646)
Loan Size 0.005 -0.003 0.065
(0.005) (0.003) (0.081)
New Loan 0.070∗ -0.041∗ -1.601∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.023) (0.613)
Male -0.036 -0.014 0.306
(0.036) (0.028) (0.618)
Multiple Loans -0.174∗∗∗ -0.018 2.074∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.028) (0.687)
Constant 0.388∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 122.162∗∗∗ 121.461∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.037) (0.015) (0.025) (0.555) (0.609)
Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1072 1072
Note: Loan size is in millions IDR. New Loan and Male are dummy variables. Columns (1)–(4) report the
estimation results using the linear probability model.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (1) and (5) in Table 4 show that the reminder has significant
unconditional effects on loan repayment. The reminder increases the
proportion of borrowers that make the repayment before the due date by
6.9% and reduces the loan period by 1.54 days. After controlling for the
loan characteristics shown in columns (2) and (6), we find that reminders
continue to generate significant effects.
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Furthermore, the results show that a new loan is more likely to be repaid
before the due date than a loan that was extended and that a loan that
is part of a multiple loan package is less likely to be repaid before the due
date than a single loan. Loans that are extended from the previous period
and multiple loans could indicate borrowers that are experiencing financial
problems preventing them from repaying their loan(s) early.
However, we find that the SMS reminder has no effect on repayment
before the auction date. This is as expected, because the auction date is a
binding deadline and most borrowers do not want to lose their pawned items.
Furthermore, the borrowers receive a letter from the pawnshop informing
them of the auction date. The only possible reason a borrower would have
to allow his or her collateral to be auctioned is that the borrower cannot
repay the loan, in which case even an SMS would be of no assistance.
Our experiment shows that reminders exert positive effects on repayment,
even in the absence of a monetary or dynamic incentive affecting borrower
behavior. In line with our first hypothesis, these outcomes are likely to be
driven by moral incentives. Two channels could be operating for this result.
First, the SMS works as a reminder for those borrowers that intend to repay
the loan before the due date. Second, the SMS could induce borrowers that
had intended to repay after the due date to change their mind, because the
SMS makes the due date more salient. This could activate M , the moral
cost. However, this experiment is not designed to separate these two possible
channels.
5.3 Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects: Gender
The interaction between moral development and gender has long been debated
in the moral psychology literature. The debate started with seminal work
by Carol Gilligan, who argued that boys’ reasoning is based on ethics of
justice, that is, they place more emphasis on rules, whereas girls’ reasoning
is based on ethics of care, that is, they place more emphasis on relationships
(Gilligan, 1982). Walker (2006) provides a critical review of Gilligan’s work,
which he claims is not robust. However, many recent experimental economic
results have pointed out that gender may well shape social preferences, and
that men and women may respond differently to the manipulation involved
in experiments (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
Accordingly, we explore whether men and women respond differently to
the SMS. In general, we expect women to be more responsive to the treatment.
To estimate the heterogeneity, we include gender as an interaction effect in
the regression model:
Yi = α+ βSMSi + γXi + δSMS ∗Gi + i. (4)
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The model above is an extension of Equation 3. Gi indicates the gender
of the borrower, taking a value of one if the borrower is male. We include an
interaction variable between SMS and Gi.
Table 5: Interaction Effect: SMS and Gender
Before Before Loan Period
Due Date Auction Date (Days)
(1) (2) (3)
SMS 0.157∗∗∗ -0.029 -2.157∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.026) (0.764)
SMS * Male -0.240∗∗∗ 0.013 1.738
(0.075) (0.050) (1.391)
Male 0.125∗∗ -0.023 -0.856
(0.061) (0.033) (1.212)
SMS+SMS*Male -0.084 -0.016 -0.419
(0.062) (0.042) (1.177)
Observations 1196 1196 1072
Note: SMS*Male indicates male borrowers that receive an SMS. Loan Size
and New Loan are included in the regression.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
borrower level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 show that the reminder increases the
percentage of women who repay before the due date by 15.7 percentage
points and reduces the number of loan days by two days, both of which are
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, we do not find any such effect for
male borrowers. In fact, the coefficient is negative for men, although not
statistically significant. This result indicates that the treatment effect is
mainly driven by women.
After the inclusion of the interaction effect between gender and the SMS
as shown in Column (1), we find that the proportion of male borrowers in
the control group who repay the loan before the due date is indeed larger
than that in the treatment group. This is probably because the men in this
study have easier access to funds for repayment than the women. The survey
data show that 43% of the female borrowers are housewives, which means
that they do not generate income.16 These results for the different treatment
effects across gender are as expected and in line with the previous literature
that shows that women are more affected by treatment in experiments.
One possible explanation of the diverging effect of the treatment is that
when men receive the reminder, they become more certain of the exact due
date and decide to delay the payment because there is no financial incentive
to pay sooner. Put differently, men consider the rules and determine that
there is nothing wrong with paying in the grace period. Another possible
explanation is the men might be using the loan for productive purposes and
16Figure A2 in the Appendix depicts the loan period by gender and treatment.
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so for them it may be more profitable to delay the payment. In contrast,
women respond to the SMS by taking action faster. This could be because
women believe it is unethical to delay the payment intentionally when they
have the money available and they have been reminded about it.
5.4 Effect of Different Types of SMS
In addition to understanding whether there is an overall treatment effect, we
were also interested in understanding whether different types of information
in the SMS would have different impacts. In particular, we wanted to know
whether people would respond differently if they were reminded about the
monetary incentive to repay the loan sooner. That is, do borrowers take
into account the difference in the interest payment when they decide on the
timing of a repayment? Hence, we divided the treatment group into two
subgroups, and sent out two different versions of the SMS, which we refer to
as Type A and Type B.
Borrowers randomly allocated to receive a Type A SMS received a
reminder about the due date. With a time period of 120 days and without
weekly installments as in microcredit, people can easily forget the exact due
date of their loan and some may even forget about the loan itself. Others
people may have an approximation of the due date, but not the exact date.
Hence, in the Type A SMS, we sent a pure reminder. The exact wording of
the Type A SMS was as follows:17
[BRANCH NAME], [DATE].
INFO: [LOAN ID] is reaching the 100th day,
will be due on [DUE DATE].
This is a reminder. Please don’t miss the payment. Thank you.
In the other subgroup, borrowers received a Type B SMS, which told
them about the monetary incentive to repay early. The incentive serves as a
reminder to the borrowers that if they pay their loan two weeks before the
due date, they could save some money. The wording of the Type B SMS is
the same as that of the Type A SMS, except we replace the last sentence
with:
If fully repaid before the [DATE 106th],
you save [1.2% x LOAN SIZE] IDR.
There were no differences in the baseline characteristics of borrowers that
were part of each treatment group and the control group.
17The words in square brackets are customized for each borrower.
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As the Type B SMS nudges people to repay even sooner and the cutoff
day of the different interest payment is day 106, we also include this cutoff
date as an outcome of interest.18 Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the
proportion of borrowers that repay before day 106 and before the due date
in both treatment groups is larger than the proportion of borrowers paying
in those periods that are part of the control group.
We then attempt to test the result by estimating the following equation:
Yi = α+ βatypeAi + βbtypeBi + γXi + i, (5)
where Y shows the outcome variables of interest as in Equation 3, typeAi
and typeBi are indicators of the kind of treatment borrowers receive and X
is a vector of loan characteristics. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Effects of Different SMS Content
Before Before Loan Period Before
Due Date Auction Date (Days) Day 106th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Type A SMS 0.072∗ 0.089∗∗ -0.014 -0.012 -1.388∗ -1.556∗∗ 0.012 0.012
(0.044) (0.042) (0.026) (0.026) (0.742) (0.740) (0.018) (0.018)
Type B SMS 0.065 0.068∗ -0.039 -0.038 -1.707∗∗ -1.650∗∗ 0.020 0.020
(0.042) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.752) (0.727) (0.018) (0.018)
Loan Size 0.005 -0.003 0.065 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.081) (0.002)
New Loan 0.071∗ -0.040∗ -1.600∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.037) (0.023) (0.613) (0.015)
Male -0.036 -0.014 0.306 0.009
(0.036) (0.028) (0.618) (0.015)
Multiple Loans -0.175∗∗∗ -0.019 2.070∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.039) (0.028) (0.687) (0.016)
Constant 0.388∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 122.162∗∗∗ 121.463∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.029) (0.037) (0.015) (0.025) (0.555) (0.608) (0.013) (0.017)
Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1072 1072 1196 1196
Type A = B
p-value 0.880 0.633 0.455 0.455 0.651 0.892 0.636 0. 647
Note: Loan size is in millions IDR. Experience is in months.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
18As the interest rate is 1.2% per 15 days, if a loan is repaid between day 91 and day
105, the interest payment is 8.4% of the loan, whereas from day 106, the interest payment
is 9.6% of the loan.
89
The regression results show that there is no difference in the treatment
effects for Type B SMS and Type A SMS in the four outcomes: namely,
repayment before the due date, repayment before the auction date, repayment
before the 106th day, and the number of loan days. Hence, adding more
information about the monetary incentive in the reminder seems to serve no
purpose. There are a couple of explanations for these outcomes. First, the
condition of the incentive is “if fully repaid”, whereas most borrowers that
repay late do not repay the loan in full. Second, the monetary incentive is
too small for most borrowers.
6 Conclusion
We conducted a field experiment to measure the impact of receiving a
reminder on loan repayment behavior. The results reveal positive treatment
effects on repayment behavior. Overall, the reminder increases the proportion
of borrowers that repay the loan before the due date by 6.9 percentage points
and reduces the average loan period by 1.5 days. We find that female
borrowers drive the overall treatment effect.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two existing studies in
this area, and the results point to somewhat different conclusions. Cadena
and Schoar (2011) show that there are overall treatment effects, but Karlan
et al. (2012) show that there are no overall effects of the SMS. Our study
contributes to the literature on the effect of reminders on repayment by
replicating the study in a different setting. Our results are then more in line
with the findings in Cadena and Schoar (2011).
The experiment shows that reminders exert positive effects on repayment
even where there is no monetary or dynamic incentive that could affect
borrower behavior. These outcomes may then be driven by moral motives
in that the SMS saves borrowers from experiencing regret and shame when
they unintentionally miss the due date.
Our results are interesting for the pawnshop concerned because this simple
intervention appears to reveal an effective way of improving the repayment
behavior of borrowers. Furthermore, the experiment results also indicate
that stating only the due date is sufficient to alter behavior. This finding is
particularly useful considering that only a limited number of characters can
be used in an SMS.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Distribution of the Loan Period
The figure depicts the distribution of the loan period for all loans made in January 2012. The
graph shows that the mode of the loan period is 120 days. This is the maximum number of days
allowed in the loan contract.
Table A1: Timing of the Action by Group (%)
Timing of the Action Type A Type B Control Total
Before Day 106 4.65 5.50 3.46 4.52
Before Day 106 & Due Date 41.32 39.79 35.31 38.80
Between Due Date & Auction Date 44.01 42.15 52.59 46.32
Unknown 10.02 12.57 8.64 10.37
Loan Period (Days) 120.77 120.45 122.16 121.15
Observations 409 382 405 1196
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Figure A2: CDF of Loan Period by Gender and Treatment
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Abstract 
Noncognitive characteristics such as risk, time and trust preferences have 
been recognized as having significant effects on individuals’ social and 
economic conditions. Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, 
this study attempts to ascertain the determinants of those preferences. The 
results show that several individual characteristics are correlated with 
preferences, and that the preferences of parents are significantly correlated 
with their offspring’s preferences. Fathers have a bigger influence on risk 
and time preferences than mothers do, while mothers have a more important 
role in shaping trust preferences. We compare our findings with those of a 
similar study that used German data. We conclude that intergenerational 
transmission of preferences is robust across countries, regardless of 
differences in institutional and policy settings. 
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1. Introduction 
Noncognitive characteristics such as perseverance, time preferences, risk aversion and 
self-control have significant effects on individuals’ social and economic conditions 
(Heckman, 2007). These characteristics are sometimes even more important than cognitive 
skills (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006). For instance, trust has been recognized as a key 
ingredient that facilitates economic exchange at the micro level (Zaheer et al., 1998), and 
countries with high levels of trust are associated with higher economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). Furthermore, risk preferences are highly correlated with whether someone 
ends up being an entrepreneur (Ekelund et al., 2005), chooses to invest in profitable crops 
(Dercon, 1996), or engages in risky activities such as smoking, sex and drugs (Gruber, 2001). 
Time preferences affect, for example, how people search for jobs (DellaVigna and Paserman, 
2005) and whether they take financial literacy training (Meier and Sprenger, 2008). 
Despite the significance of these preferences, little is known about how these 
preferences are formed, and more research on this issue is needed (Heckman and Rubinstein, 
2001). This study responds to this call by investigating what factors determine preferences, 
focusing on the role of family and surroundings in shaping children’s preferences. It is 
reasonable to imagine that one’s preferences are influenced by one’s surroundings, and that 
family plays an important role in shaping these preferences. This is known as family 
endowment, which is determined by “the reputation and ‘connections’ of their families, the 
contribution to the ability, race, and other characteristics of children from constitutions of 
their families, and learning, skills, goals, and other ‘family commodities’ acquired through 
belonging to a particular family culture” (Becker and Tomes, 1979, p. 1158). 
This endowment may eventually contribute to similar outcomes between parents and 
their offspring, such as occupational choice (Chevalier, 2001). This, consequently, has an 
influence on intergenerational social mobility and inequality, as shown in the model 
developed by Solon (2004), who modified the model of Becker and Tomes (1979). In Solon’s 
model, intergenerational mobility decreases as the degree of inheritability of endowment 
increases.1 
Intergenerational social mobility and inequality are central issues in development, not 
only in developing countries but also in developed countries (Corak, 2004). However, few 
empirical studies estimate the size of the endowment effect. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
studies on intergenerational transmission of education, attitudes and income using developed 
countries’ data have been conducted over the past few decades, almost no research scrutinizes 
this issue using data from developing countries. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Solon (2004) showed that there are four important aspects that affect intergenerational mobility and inequality. 
In addition to the degree of inheritability of the endowment effect, the three other aspects are the efficacy of 
human capital investment, the earnings return to human capital and progressivity of public investment in human 
capital. 
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This study aims to fill this gap by examining the similarity between parents’ and 
children’s fundamental attitudes regarding trust, risk and time preferences by looking at data 
from Indonesia. This study aims to shed light on intergenerational social mobility in 
Indonesia. To the best of our knowledge, only Pakpahan et al. (2009) has examined 
intergenerational transmission in Indonesia. They reported that children from a chronically 
poor family will have a 35 percent higher probability of being poor compared with a child 
who is not from a poor family.2 
Location aside, the most-similar previous study to ours is Dohmen et al. (2012). Using 
data on 3751 child, mother and father sets taken from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
Study (SOEP), they scrutinized the transmission process of risk and trust attitudes. Their 
study showed that children’s attitudes are shaped not only by parents’ attitudes but also by the 
local environment. Furthermore, they showed that there is a tendency for parents to perform 
assortative mating when selecting each other as a partner. In that case, people choose a partner 
who shares similar preferences to their own with the intention of having offspring who have 
the same preferences.3 
In this study, we utilize data on risk, time and trust preferences from the fourth wave of 
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which was carried out in 2007–2008. The fact that 
the survey measured the preferences of all adult members of the households is an advantage 
because the same metrics are used to measure the preferences of both parents and children. 
The regression results on the determinants of preferences show that several individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, place of residence, religion, subjective well-being, current 
activity and ethnicity are correlated with the three preferences. 
The regression results on the role of parents’ preferences show that there is a positive 
correlation between the children’s and the parents’ trust, risk and time preferences. The 
mother has a bigger role in shaping the children’s trust behavior than the father does, while 
the father has a bigger role than the mother does in shaping the children’s willingness to take 
risks and willingness to be patient. We also find that the local environment has an influence 
on children’s preferences. In general, we find similar results and patterns as found in Dohmen 
et al. (2012). Therefore, we conclude that intergenerational transmission of preferences seems 
robust across countries, regardless of differences in institutional and policy settings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the results for both the determinants 
and intergenerational transmission of preferences. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 
provides concluding comments. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 They utilized data from IFLS1 and IFLS3. 
3 Additional discussion of the results of Dohmen et al. (2012) is provided below. 
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2. Data Description 
The main reason for the limited amount of research on intergenerational issues in 
developing countries is the absence of the longitudinal data necessary for analyzing such 
issues. In a longitudinal data set, researchers have information about the same subjects 
observed at different points of time. Even in developed countries, there is still an ongoing 
process to make this type of data available (Corak, 2004). 
In this study, we take advantage of the IFLS, the first and the most comprehensive 
longitudinal data set available in the country. Four rounds of the survey have been conducted. 
The first wave (IFLS1) was conducted in 1993, and the latest wave (IFLS4) was conducted in 
2007–2008.4 In IFLS2 and the subsequent surveys, the households that were interviewed in 
IFLS1, including the split households, were revisited. 5  In addition to the household 
information, the IFLS also collects individual-specific information by interviewing each adult 
member of the households. 
The fact that the IFLS collects information from all adult members of the households 
creates an advantage for the present analysis because characteristics and preferences of both 
parents and children are observed, and the same metrics are applied to the two generations. 
Furthermore, the fact that the IFLS follows the split households provides an advantage in the 
sense that it is still possible to include data for a child who has moved out from his/her 
parents’ house.6 
To construct pairs of children and parents, we use roster data from the first wave of the 
IFLS. The reason for using the IFLS1 to establish the pairs is to make sure that a child who 
has moved out from his/her parents’ house will not be excluded from the analysis. Given this 
approach, we observe a wide range of ages of the children. In total, there are 6166 adult 
children who can be matched with their parents.7 Subsequently, the pairs were merged with 
the characteristics and preferences data. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 IFLS1 interviewed 7224 households in 13 provinces in Indonesia, which represent 83% of the population of the 
country. IFLS2 was conducted in 1997, and IFLS3 was carried out in 2000. In 1998, 25% of the sample of 
IFLS1 was reinterviewed in order to assess the immediate impact of the Asian financial crisis. This wave, which 
was called IFLS2+, was not released for public use. For more detail about the IFLS, including the attrition and 
recontact protocols, consult Strauss et al. (2009). When the IFLS was conducted for the first time, there were 27 
provinces in Indonesia. At the time this paper was being written, there were 34 provinces in Indonesia. 
5  Split households are subhouseholds that are established after one member moves out from the main 
household—for example, a child who moves out and establishes a new household after marriage. 
6 Not all split households were reinterviewed; those who moved out to provinces where the IFLS was not 
conducted were unlikely to be reinterviewed. 
7 An adult is defined as 15 years or older. These 6166 children come from 2368 families, indicating that on 
average, there are two to three children in a household. Because of this, in the regression analysis we always 
cluster the standard errors at the household level. 
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Data on characteristics and background, such as years of education, age, marital status, 
gender, ethnicity, religion, subjective well-being and preferences are taken from IFLS4. 
Questions on risk and time preferences, as well as trust attitudes toward people who live in 
the same village, were included for the first time in IFLS4. For each measure of risk 
preferences and time preferences, there are two hypothetical questions, while for trust 
preferences, there are several responses measured using a Likert scale. 
One critique of the hypothetical questions used to measure preferences is that they do 
not reflect people’s real behavior. However, Dohmen et al. (2011) showed that the behavior 
of representative samples in a lottery experiment is correlated with their response to the 
general risk question in a survey. On the trust measures, a similar trust measure to the one we 
used here was tested in Fehr et al. (2002). They showed that the behavior of the sender in a 
trust game could be predicted by their response to the questionnaire about trust. 
The measurement of preferences in this study is similar to that of Dohmen et al. (2012). 
However, for trust measurement, in our study, we use responses to eight statements compared 
with three statements used in Dohmen et al. (2012).8 To measure risk in general, Dohmen et 
al. (2012) used an 11-point scale. In addition, their study used a hypothetical lottery. In this 
study, risk is measured by a principal component analysis (PCA) score from two questions on 
a hypothetical lottery.9 
The types of questions we use to assess risk preferences are similar to those reported in 
Barsky et al. (1997). The first question is “Suppose you have two ways to earn income. Option 
(1) guarantees you an income of Rp 800,000 per month. In option (2), you have an equal 
chance of receiving either Rp. 1,600,000 per month or Rp. 400,000 per month, depending on 
how lucky you are. Which option will you choose?” The second question is similar, though the 
payoffs are different: “Option (1) guarantees you an income of Rp 4,000,000 per month. In 
option (2), you have an equal chance of receiving either Rp 12,000,000 per month or nothing, 
depending on how lucky you are. Which option will you choose?” Depending on the 
respondents’ answer to each question, there are follow up questions that will increase the 
“risky” payoff if the respondent chooses the “safe” option and will reduce the “risky” payoff 
if the respondent chooses the “risky” option. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There are three statements to measure trust in Dohmen et al. (2012): “In general, one can trust people.” 
“These days you cannot rely on anybody else.” “When dealing with strangers it is better to be cautious.” The 
respondents rate these based on a four-point Likert scale labeled strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree 
somewhat, and strongly disagree. 
9 “The central idea of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large number of 
interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data set. This is 
achieved by transforming the data into a new set of variables, the principal components (PCs), which are 
uncorrelated, and which are ordered so that the ﬁrst few retain most of the variation present in all of the original 
variables” (Jollieffe, 2002, p. 1). 
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Respondents’ time preferences are measured from their responses to the following two 
questions. The first question is “You have won the lottery. You can choose between being paid 
(1) Rp 1,000,000 today or (2) Rp 3,000,000 in one year. Which one do you choose?” The 
second question is “You have won the lottery. You can choose between being paid (1) Rp 
1,000,000 today or (2) Rp 4,000,000 in five years. Which one do you choose?” Similar to the 
measurement of risk preferences, depending on the respondents’ answers, for each question 
there are follow up questions that will increase the “later” payoff if respondents choose the 
“immediate” option and will reduce the “later” payoff if respondents choose the “later” 
option. 
Based on their responses, the respondents are categorized into one of four categories 
regarding risk and time preferences; smaller values represent a greater degree of risk aversion 
and more patience.10 The two risk preference responses and two time preference responses are 
compressed using PCA. We use the first PCA score as our individual measure of risk and 
time preferences. 
To measure trust preferences, we include responses from several questions on trust 
related to the community/village, such as: “Do you help people?; Should you be cautious?; 
Do you trust only people who have the same ethnicity?; Are you able to ask neighbors to take 
care of the house?; Do you believe someone who lives in the village, a policeman, and a 
complete stranger would return your wallet if they found it?; Do you trust only people who 
have the same religion?” We recoded the answers so that the four categories of responses 
reflect higher levels of trust as the scale increases. These eight responses are compressed 
using PCA, and we use the first PCA score as the measure of trust. 
The PCA scores for risk, time and trust preferences are standardized so that the mean of 
each variable is zero, with a standard deviation equal to one. Standardization enables us to 
discuss and compare the regression coefficients directly, as the variables now have the same 
scale of measurement. We standardize each set of preferences for children, fathers and 
mothers separately. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The questions on risk and time preferences are preceded by a question that is used to check the 
respondents’ understanding of the questions. For example, for the risk preference questions the preceding 
question is: “Suppose you are offered two ways to earn some money. With option (1) you are guaranteed IDR 
800,000 per month. With option (2), you have an equal chance of either the same income, IDR 800,000 per 
month, or, if you are lucky, IDR 1,600,000 per month. Which option will you choose?” For this particular 
question, 40% of the respondents chose option (1), which seems an irrational response. The responses suggest 
that both parents and children can be irrational. Because of that, we still include the irrational response in the 
analysis because we find strong correlation in the irrational responses of parents and children. We record the 
answer as extremely risk averse, as people prefer certainty compared with a lottery with a higher expected 
payoff; thus, we have five categories prior to the PCA. These questions are part of Book 3A, Module SI in 
IFLS4. 
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The descriptive statistics of the pairs are reported in Table 1. The average age of the 
children, mothers and fathers are 24, 50 and 55 years, respectively. The gender of the children 
is equally divided between female and male. Of the children, 55% are living in an urban area, 
while 50% of the parents are living in urban areas. On average, children have more years of 
schooling than their parents. Children have 11 years of education, while fathers and mothers 
have 7.5 and 6 years of education, respectively. Of the pairs, 90% are Muslims, and the other 
10% are either Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Hindus or Confucians. Among the children, 
51% are working, 21% attend school and 18% are housekeepers. In terms of subjective well-
being, the stated position of the children is no different from that of their parents. Four percent 
rate themselves in the poorest category, 21% rate themselves in the second poorest category, 
55% rate themselves in the middle of the distribution, 18% rate themselves in the slightly 
above average category and 1% rate themselves in the above average category. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
To find the determinants of preferences, we estimate the following equation:  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓! = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋! + 𝜀!,         (1) 
where Pref represents the outcomes of interest, which are trust, risk and time preferences. 
Subscript 𝑖 represents each individual in the analysis. 𝑋! represents a set of characteristics of 
person 𝑖 that may influence the preferences of that person. These characteristics are gender, 
age, ethnicity, religion, educational background, place of living, subjective well-being, current 
activity and marital status. 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Previous studies, both 
theoretical and empirical, have pointed out the importance of these variables in explaining the 
preferences that we are interested in.11 The sample that is used to estimate equation (1) 
includes all respondents of IFLS4 who are older than 15 years, which is more than 28,000 
observations. 
To estimate the intergenerational correlation of preferences, we include each preference 
measure of fathers and mothers in equation (1). Consequently, only observations that can be 
matched with both the father and the mother are included in the regression. The household 
roster of IFLS1 is used as the basis on which to establish the pairs of children and parents. 
Each child that was recorded in IFLS1 was matched with its father and mother. Then, we 
merge the pairs with the preferences and characteristics that were collected in IFLS4. We 
regress the preferences of the child on the preferences of the parents, and we control for the 
child’s and the parents’ characteristics. As there are a number of households that have more 
than one child, we cluster the standard errors of the estimations at the household level. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Some examples: Becker and Mulligan (1997) considered the role of wealth and income on time preferences; 
Chao et al. (2009) considered age and time preferences; Dohmen et al. (2011) considered the determinants of 
risk preferences; Benjamin et al. (2010) considered social identity and preferences; Güth et al. (2008) and 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) considered the determinants of trust; Croson and Buchan (1999) considered 
gender and trust; and Compton (2009) considered marital status and time preferences. 
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The equation to be estimated is: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑐! = 𝛼 + 𝛾!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑚! + 𝛾!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑓! + 𝛽𝑋𝑐! + 𝛽!𝑋𝑚! + 𝛽!𝑋𝑓! + 𝜀! ,  (2) 
where Pref is the measure of preferences and X is a set of characteristics. The subscripts c, m 
and f represent the children, mothers and fathers, respectively. In addition to 𝛽, we also have 
another parameter to be estimated, 𝛾, which is the correlation of the fathers’ and mothers’ 
preferences with the preferences of their children. 
Furthermore, we are interested in the role of the place where the child grows up in 
shaping a child’s trust, risk and time preferences. Hence, we estimate equation (2) and add a 
measure of each preference in the local environment. The measure of the local environment is 
constructed from the mean of the standardized measure of preferences of all people who live 
in the local environment, but not including the pairs. This is to make sure that we do not 
include parents’ behavior when measuring the local environment. The location where the 
father resides is used as the local environment that might shape the children’s preferences. 
The assumption made here is that the place where the father resides is the place where the 
child grew up. Another assumption we make is that the average preferences in the local 
environment are time-invariant. The equation to be estimated is: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑐!" = 𝛼 + 𝛾!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑚!" + 𝛾!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑓!" + 𝛾!𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓!! + 𝛽𝑋𝑐! + 𝛽!𝑋𝑚! + 𝛽!𝑋𝑓! + 𝜀!, (3) 
where  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓_𝑐!"   are the preferences of a child 𝑖 who lives in village 𝑗.  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓!! is the average of 
the preferences from people not living in village 𝑗. 𝛾! is the parameter to be estimated that 
measures the influence of the local environment on children’s behavior. The other variables 
and parameters are similar to those in equation (2). 
 
4. Results 
4.1.  The Determinants of Preferences 
Table 2 reports the regression results from the estimation of equation (1) for the three 
preferences, trust, risk and time, in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Age is positively 
correlated with trust, which has also been shown in Welch et al. (2007) and associated with 
significantly more impatience and less willingness to take risks. 
Gender significantly affects risk preferences and trusting behavior, but has no effect on 
time preferences. Males are significantly more willing to take risks, which confirms previous 
findings that gender is related to risk aversion, as reviewed in Croson and Gneezy (2009). 
There is no consensus on how gender affects trust preferences; trust depends more on the 
context (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Our results show that males are less trusting. 
Furthermore, for time preferences, there is also no consensus on whether women or men are 
more patient or whether there is no difference. This finding is similar to that of Harrison et al. 
(2002). 
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Living in an urban area may significantly affect trust and time preferences, but not risk 
preferences. Urban dwellers are less trusting, but more patient. In urban areas, people move 
dwellings frequently and interaction with neighbors is more limited; therefore, it is expected 
that urban dwellers are less trusting. The result that urban people tend to be more patient than 
rural people seems counterintuitive, as it seems reasonable to assume that because the 
opportunity cost of time in urban areas is probably larger than in rural areas, people would be 
more impatient in urban areas. 
The number of years a person spent in school is a significant predictor of all three types 
of preferences. More years in school are associated with less trusting behavior, more 
willingness to take a risk and less impatience. The relationships between years of schooling 
and the types of preferences, particularly the risk and time preferences, are as expected. 
However, it is important to note that the relationship does not necessarily signify causality, as 
we could not identify whether it is schooling that determines preferences or the other way 
around. We do find that the more patient people are, the more schooling they have received. 
Furthermore, the result that the number of years of education is associated with less trust is 
counterintuitive. Following Glaeser et al. (2000), one would expect that people with more 
education are more trusting. 
Marital status seems to be associated with time preferences, but not with the other two 
types of preferences. An unmarried person tends to be more patient than a married person. A 
married person probably has higher expenditure, hence he/she is more impatient. 
Religion only has an influence on trust preferences and time preferences. Compared 
with the Muslims, who are the majority, followers of all other religions are less trusting. This 
confirms the previous findings that minorities—in this case, religious minorities—are 
significantly less trusting (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Johansson-Stenman, 2009). 
Furthermore, it seems that Catholic believers are significantly more patient than the majority. 
Subjective well-being is significantly associated with all three types of preferences, 
although such a relationship is not monotonic for trust and time preferences. For risk 
preferences, compared with the individuals who stated that they are the poorest, respondents 
with other levels of well-being are more willing to take risks, and the coefficient becomes 
larger as the level of well-being increases. However, some of the coefficients are not 
significant. This is probably because of the small sample size in the different categories in the 
wealth scale. For the trust preferences, respondents in the second up to the fifth level seem to 
have less willingness to trust, while respondents in the highest level are more trusting than 
respondents in the lowest level. For time preferences, compared with the respondents in the 
lowest level, respondents in the second and third levels are more impatient, while those in the 
fourth, fifth and sixth levels are more patient. 
People’s current activity is correlated with their preferences. For example, those who 
are looking for a job are more willing to take risks than people who are working. However, 
people who are unemployed but are not actively looking for a job are less willing to take risks 
than people who are employed. 
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Ethnicity also plays an important role in one’s preferences. We controlled for 26 
ethnicities. 12  The preferences of Javanese, the biggest ethnic group in Indonesia, are 
significantly different from the preferences of several other ethnicities. 
4.2. Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Preferences 
In this subsection, we report the correlations between a parent’s and a child’s 
preferences. Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 3 show that there is an unconditional positive 
correlation between the preferences of the parent and the preferences of the child. Both 
parents have an impact on their child’s preferences. However, the statistical test on the 
difference in the size of the coefficients indicates that, in comparison with a mother, a father 
has a much bigger role in shaping their child’s risk preferences (p = 0.02) and time 
preferences (p = 0.04). The result for the child’s trust preferences is the opposite: the mother 
has a greater role than the father (p = 0.05). 
The influence of the parents on the child’s time preferences is smaller than their 
influence on the other two preferences. Having both a father and a mother who are one 
standard deviation higher in terms of time preferences results in the child being 0.20 standard 
deviations higher in terms of time preferences, compared with his/her peers who have parents 
with average levels of time preferences. For risk and trust preferences, the total influences are 
0.24 and 0.32 standard deviations, respectively. The magnitude of the coefficients of risk and 
trust preferences shows the same tendency as was shown in Dohmen et al. (2012), who found 
that the influence of parents is 0.32 standard deviations for risk preferences and 0.40 standard 
deviations for trust preferences.13 These results suggest that the correlation between the child 
and the parent for trust preferences is stronger than the correlation for other types of 
preferences. The results are robust after having included a set of control variables used in the 
regressions (reported in Table 3, columns (2), (4) and (6)). 
After inclusion of both parents’ preferences, we find that children’s characteristics such 
as age, gender and living in an urban area remain as significant explanatory variables. The 
number of years of schooling remains an important determinant of the three types of 
preferences. However, the role of education is much smaller than the role of parents’ 
preferences; it takes a decade of education to make a child who has a parent with an average 
measure of risk preferences have the same preferences as a child who has a parent with a risk 
preference that is one standard deviation higher than average. Furthermore, it takes many 
more years of education to make a child with a parent who is one standard deviation more 
impatient to be similar to a child whose parent has average time preferences. This might 
support Heckman’s (2007) suggestion that in order to help people reach a higher social and 
economic status, early childhood intervention in a noncognitive skill is much more important 
than intervention at a later stage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ethnicity is included as an explanatory variable; however, because of limited space, it is not reported in Table 
2. 
13 Although	  the measurement of preferences in this study is similar to the one by Dohmen et al. (2012), the data 
come from different sources with different sets of questions. Consequently, the magnitude of the results from the 
two studies cannot be compared literally; nevertheless, a comparison of qualitative results is possible. 
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In the regressions, we also include the characteristics of the parents such as age and 
educational background. For age, we use the difference in age between the parents and the 
children. This difference might affect the closeness of the relationship between the parents 
and the child. It turns out that these variables have no significant effect on the child’s 
preferences after controlling for the child’s characteristics. 
One might think that the correlations between the parents’ and the child’s preferences 
might emerge because the parent and the child observe answers from each other when 
responding to the questions. As a robustness check, we estimate the model using two different 
subsamples: (1) children who do not live in the same household as their parents, and (2) 
children who answer the questions in the absence of any other adult respondents except their 
spouses. In these two subsamples, we are sure that when the child answered the questions on 
preferences, the parents were not present. Columns (2) and (3) in panels (a), (b) and (c) of 
Table 4 show that the correlation between the preferences of parents and the preferences of 
the child remain robust; thus, we reject the cross-influencing hypothesis. 
Another important concern is whether the correlation operates the other way around. It 
is possible that the attitude of parents is shaped by their children’s attitudes.14 We have found 
that education is the other factor that determines people’s attitudes in addition to their parents’ 
attitudes. Hence, as a robustness check, we exclude all children who have more education 
than their parents. We use average years of education of the father and mother to create the 
cutoff. Assuming that children with a lower educational background than their parents might 
have more difficulty in affecting the preferences of their parents, correlation of the 
preferences of the parents and the child in this subsample will not be influenced by reverse 
causality. The result in column (4) of Table 4 (A) indicates that the correlation of trust 
preferences is robust; in terms of risk and time preferences, only the correlation with either 
the father or the mother is significant (see column (4) of panels (B) and (C) in the same table). 
This might be because of the small sample size. 
 
4.3. The Influence of Environment on a Child’s Preferences 
Heckman (2007) mentioned that environment, together with the family, plays an 
important role in the development of the noncognitive skills, such as time and risk 
preferences, of a child. In this section, we scrutinize the importance of the local environment 
in shaping children’s preferences. Local environment is measured by the mean score of the 
standardized preferences in a community. To calculate this, we use data from a full adult 
sample of IFLS4 and exclude the children and parents who are included in the regressions 
from the calculation of the mean. Table 5 shows that environment has a significant influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The most common way to deal with this issue when having an observational data set is to use the instrumental 
variable approach. However, finding good instruments is a challenge in implementing this approach. Dohmen et 
al. (2012) use parental characteristics as instruments for parents’ attitudes. However, their instruments turn out to 
be weak, which eventually creates a problem of large standard errors of the estimates and large inconsistencies in 
the IV estimates (Bound et al., 1995). For this reason, we try to use a subsample to show that causality is not 
reversed. 
107
on a child’s preferences, even after having controlled for the parents’ preferences. The 
environment has a higher impact than the total influence of both parents. A child who lives in 
an area where its dwellers have a one standard deviation higher willingness to take risks 
compared with a child who lives in an area whose dwellers have an average willingness to 
take risks will end up having a 0.4 standard deviations higher willingness to take risks. For 
trust preferences, the effect of environment is much larger than the impact of the mother’s and 
father’s trust preferences. Considering that the question on trust preferences is measured at the 
community level (e.g., “Do you want to help people in this village”), the response from 
children, parents and the other members of the community to this question is highly correlated 
with the safety and trust endowment in the village. This then makes the child’s trust 
preferences highly correlated with the mean trust preferences of all members in the village. 
Preferences and other noncognitive skills are developed over a lifetime; however, the 
best time to acquire and strengthen these skills is during early childhood (Heckman, 2007; 
Knudsen et al., 2006). In terms of similarity between the parents’ and the child’s preferences, 
one would expect that, at a young age, mothers’ and fathers’ preferences are probably the 
most important factors in determining a child’s preferences. However, as they learn more 
from school, friends and their surroundings, the similarities in preferences of children and 
parents might decrease. We test this hypothesis on the subsample of children who are in the 
youngest age category (15 years old). We find, as reported in column (5) of panels (a), (b) and 
(c) in Table 4, that mothers have a bigger role in shaping the child’s trust and time preferences 
when they are still very young, while fathers do not seem to have much of an impact in 
shaping these two preferences during this time. However, the results show that the importance 
of the father’s preferences in shaping the risk preferences of his children occurs at a very early 
age. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the results and compare them with those of Dohmen et al. 
(2012). Their main finding was that preferences are shaped by parents passing on their 
preferences to their children, and by local environment exposure. In addition, they found that 
assortative mating among couples might affect the strength of the transmission of preferences. 
Our study and that of Dohmen et al. (2012) utilize data from two different countries 
with different institutional and public policy backgrounds. Furthermore, Germany and 
Indonesia are at different developmental stages. In Germany, people are supported by state 
welfare systems, while in Indonesia people most likely rely on their own savings or personal 
networks to finance certain expenditure, such as on education and health. Hence, the 
circumstances in which people make economic decisions vary greatly between the two 
countries. Even accounting for these differences in social and economic contexts, the results 
of this study and the one by Dohmen et al. (2012) are surprisingly similar. 
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On the issue of intergenerational transmission of preferences, both studies show that 
there is a positive correlation between the parents’ and the child’s attitudes toward risk and 
trust.15 Furthermore, using data from Indonesia, as found in Dohmen et al. (2012), the mother 
has a greater influence on the child’s trust behavior. The intimacy of the mother and her child 
at a young age might develop trust between them, and a child starts to learn about trust from 
their mother at a very early stage of his/her life. This might indicate that children learn about 
their parents’ attitudes toward trust earlier than they learn about other attitudes (such as risk 
and time preferences). This finding is in line with Knudsen et al. (2006), who reported that 
children could obtain different traits at different stages of childhood. 
In terms of the effect a father or a mother has on the child’s willingness to take a risk, 
Dohmen et al. (2012) found that both parents play a similar role; in contrast, we find that the 
father’s preferences play a stronger role than those of the mother. This difference might be 
because, in many developing countries, it is often the man, the main breadwinner, who makes 
household decisions. Even if a couple is making a joint decision, the husband tends to have a 
stronger influence on the final decision (Carlsson et al., 2010). Hence, a child probably learns 
more about risk and time preferences by observing frequent decision making by his/her father. 
Our results are consistent with those of Paola (forthcoming), who used occupational status as 
a proxy of the father’s willingness to take risks. She found that university students’ 
willingness to take risks is related to their fathers’ occupation, but not to their mothers’ or 
their own choice of occupation. 
We then check whether there is an easier transmission of preferences within the same 
gender (i.e., from the father to his son and from the mother to her daughter). For time and 
trust preferences, we do not find such evidence. For risk preferences, both fathers’ and 
mothers’ preferences have the same effect on their daughter’s, while, for sons, the fathers’ 
preferences play a much bigger role in shaping risk preferences. Again, this probably relates 
to the fact that the son is expected to be a future income provider for his family; thus, he has 
to learn more from his father about economic decision-making. This probably explains why 
the son often ends up taking an occupation similar to his father’s (Chevalier, 2001).16 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study showed that parents’ preferences and the local environment play a significant 
role in the formation of a child’s preferences. In general, the results of this study confirm what 
has been reported in Dohmen et al. (2012). This outcome is surprising, given that the two 
studies utilize data from two countries with very different institutions and policies. This seems 
to suggest that the attitude toward a particular set of preferences can be passed on from the 
parents’ generation to the child’s generation, regardless of the institutional setting. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Time preferences were not assessed in Dohmen et al. (2012). 
16 Chevalier (2001) reported that in one cohort of university graduates in the UK, 10% end up having the same 
occupation as their parents, and almost one-third are in the same occupational group, and that a son receives a 
wage premium compared with a daughter with the same occupation as the parent. 
109
Our analysis also pointed out that it takes many years of education for a child whose 
parents have an average preference level to develop preferences similar to a child of parents 
having a one standard deviation higher/lower preference level. This finding is in line with 
Heckman (2007), who suggested that remediation in the early childhood period would have a 
better impact than providing training at a later stage of life. 
The two key results (that children’s preferences end up similar to those of their parents 
and those prevalent in the local environment and that it takes many years of education to 
create the same effect; and that these results hold in two countries that are at different stages 
of development) help to shed light on the existence of intergenerational social immobility, as 
well as the persistence of inequality between countries. As a child grows up with his/her 
parents, the child tends to take economic decisions, such as occupational choice or an 
investment in physical and human capital, similar to those the parents would take; thus, 
eventually the child is likely to have an economic status highly correlated with that of his/her 
parents. This then contributes to the lack of social mobility within countries. Furthermore, as 
the same pattern exists in different countries, this might contribute to the persistent economic 
status of a country as a whole. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Child Mother Father 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 24.02 6.47 49.74 8.38 55.27 9.43 
Gender 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Urban habitat 0.55 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Years of schooling 11.08 3.77 5.91 4.46 7.35 4.81 
       Marital Status 
      Unmarried 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Married 0.43 0.50 0.99 0.11 0.99 0.08 
Divorced 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 
       Religion 
      Islam 0.89 0.31 0.89 0.31 0.89 0.31 
Protestant 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Catholic 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 
Buddhist 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 
Hindu 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
Confucian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Activity 
      Working 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.84 0.37 
Looking 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 
Schooling 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Housekeeper 0.18 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.01 0.09 
Retired 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.28 
Unemployed 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.23 
Sick 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.12 
       Subjective Well-being 
     First 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 
Second 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Third 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Fourth 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 
Fifth 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 
Sixth 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 
Observations 6166  6166  6166  
This table provides the characteristics of respondents that can be matched for child–parent pairs. In 
total, there are 6166 pairs. The characteristics are disaggregated according to whether the 
respondent is a child, mother or father. Age and Years of schooling are measured in years, while the 
other variables are dummy variables having a value of 1 if the characteristic indicated by the 
variable name is present in the respondent, otherwise, the value will be 0. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Preferences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Willingness to 
Trust 
Willingness to 
Take Risks  
Unwillingness to 
Wait 
    
Age 0.004*** –0.001* 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male –0.033** 0.188*** –0.000 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Live in urban area –0.224*** –0.002 –0.050*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Years in school –0.009*** 0.012*** –0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Marital status: Unmarried –0.002 0.009 –0.059*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Marital status: Divorced –0.037 –0.010 0.030 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) 
Religion: Protestant –0.135*** 0.033 0.056 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) 
Religion: Catholic –0.145*** 0.000 –0.126** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.063) 
Religion: Buddhist –0.100 –0.033 0.028 
 (0.070) (0.064) (0.056) 
Religion: Hindu –0.221 0.194 0.114 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.140) 
Subj. well-being: Second level –0.051 0.020 0.087*** 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.033) 
Subj. well-being: Third level –0.075** 0.018 0.071** 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) 
Subj. well-being: Fourth level –0.034 0.143*** –0.003 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.036) 
Subj. well-being: Fifth level –0.081 0.143** –0.043 
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.073) 
Subj. well-being: Sixth level 0.132 0.165 –0.579*** 
 (0.154) (0.135) (0.194) 
Activity: Looking for job –0.008 0.129* –0.024 
 (0.084) (0.074) (0.074) 
Activity: Schooling 0.103*** –0.037 –0.149*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Activity: Housekeeper –0.015 –0.051*** 0.027 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Activity: Retired –0.036 –0.175*** 0.135*** 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.032) 
Activity: Unemployed 0.011 –0.060** 0.014 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Activity: Sick –0.147* 0.016 0.069 
 (0.083) (0.089) (0.072) 
Constant 0.164*** –0.187*** –0.095** 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.043) 
Observations 25475 28213 28304 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.077 0.030 
This table reports OLS estimates with clustering standard errors at the household level. The dependent variables in 
columns (1), (2) and (3) are trust, risk and time preferences, respectively, measured by standardized first principal 
component scores. All independent variables other than age and years of schooling are dummy variables showing 
characteristics of an observation in terms of gender, place of living, marital status, religion, subjective well-being and 
current activity. Subjective well-being captures respondents’ perception of their well-being status, ranging from the 
poorest (1) to the richest (6). Age and years of schooling have number of years as the unit of measurement. Another 
characteristic that is controlled for but is not reported in this table is ethnicity. There are 26 ethnicities in the data set. 
All data come from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS4). 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4. Robustness Check 
(a). Willingness to Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Child Outside 
Home 
Absence of 
Other adult 
Less-educated 
Child 
15-Year-Old 
Child 
Mother’s trust preferences 0.162*** 0.118*** 0.162*** 0.147*** 0.229*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.067) 
Father’s trust preferences 0.119*** 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.162*** 0.116 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.050) (0.076) 
Constant 0.403*** 0.370* 0.533** 0.461 0.336 
 (0.140) (0.206) (0.240) (0.376) (0.526) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4530 1997 1971 684 261 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.083 0.099 0.096 0.243 
 
(b). Willingness to Take Risks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Child Outside 
Home 
Absence of 
Other adult 
Less-educated 
Child 
15-Year-Old 
Child 
Mother’s 0.053*** 0.047** 0.052** 0.022 0.109 
willingness to take risks (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.045) (0.071) 
Father’s 0.111*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.119*** 0.107* 
willingness to take risks (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.063) 
Constant –0.504*** –0.569*** –0.423** –0.522 0.270 
 (0.119) (0.173) (0.180) (0.330) (0.491) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5877 2637 2577 869 341 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.106 0.067 0.060 0.062 
 
(c). Unwillingness to Wait 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full Sample Child Outside 
Home 
Absence of 
Other adult 
Less-educated 
Child 
15-Year-Old 
Child 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Mother’s 0.059*** 0.036 0.048* 0.085* 0.232*** 
unwillingness to wait (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.046) (0.071) 
Father’s 0.103*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.066 0.110 
unwillingness to wait (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.041) (0.070) 
Constant –0.000 0.044 –0.102 0.216 –0.676 
 (0.133) (0.182) (0.214) (0.436) (0.591) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5882 2633 2567 866 340 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.052 0.057 0.055 0.127 
This table reports OLS estimates with clustering standard errors at the household level. Column (1) in panels A, B and C 
is reproduced from columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 2, respectively. The specifications in columns (2)–(5) are the same 
as in column (1). The regressions control for both children’s and parents’ characteristics, but the results are not shown in 
the table because the most important thing to show is that the influence of parents’ preferences is robust, even after we 
estimate regressions on the different subsamples. Column (2) shows the regression results for the subsample of children 
who live outside their parents’ house; column (3) shows the regression results for the subsample of children who 
answered the questions in the absence of their parents; column (4) shows the regression results for the subsample of 
children who have less education than their parents; and column (5) reports the regression results for the subsample of 
children who are 15 years old. All data come from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS4). 
However, in constructing the pairs, the household roster from IFLS1 is used. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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uc
ed
 fr
om
 T
ab
le
 4
, c
ol
um
n 
(1
), 
pa
ne
ls
 (a
), 
(b
) a
nd
 (c
), 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 T
he
 s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(2
) a
re
 s
im
ila
r t
o 
co
lu
m
n 
(1
), 
ex
ce
pt
 th
at
 w
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
fo
r t
he
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f v
ill
ag
e 
le
ve
l o
f t
ru
st
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
, w
hi
ch
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
re
si
de
nt
s’
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
w
he
re
 th
e 
fa
th
er
 re
si
de
s, 
th
ou
gh
 p
ar
en
ts
 a
nd
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ar
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
n.
 In
 c
ol
um
n 
(4
), 
w
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ris
k 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
in
 t
he
 v
ill
ag
e,
 a
nd
 i
n 
co
lu
m
n 
(6
), 
w
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
tim
e 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s. 
Th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
fo
r 
bo
th
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
pa
re
nt
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s. 
A
ll 
da
ta
 c
om
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
fo
ur
th
 w
av
e 
of
 th
e 
In
do
ne
si
an
 F
am
ily
 L
ife
 S
ur
ve
y 
(I
FL
S4
). 
H
ow
ev
er
, i
n 
co
ns
tru
ct
in
g 
th
e 
pa
irs
, t
he
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 ro
st
er
 fr
om
 IF
LS
1 
is
 u
se
d.
  
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
*  p
 <
 0
.0
5,
 **
 p
 <
 0
.0
1,
 **
*  p
 <
 0
.0
01
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